Skallagrim
Well-known member
I'm going to limit my response a bit to leave aside points we've either fully discussed or which veer off into too much digression -- both to stay generally on-topic and to adhere to my own time constraints. Hope that's okay!
A scenario where Germany has achieved its Eastern ambitions on a reasonable schedule, and has fought an effective defensive war in the West, allows for different considerations. To some extent requires it, even. It's now clear that the war is more expensive than what it's worth in prospective spoils. Germany is defensive in the West. If it wants real concessions, it needs to start winning. If it offers peace with honour, it may expect France to cave. The former approach has the additional risk that real German break-outs may icite Britain to enter after all. ("Must keep the Hun from the Channel at all costs!")
Given this, offering a white peace is by far the more attractive option here. It ends the war, it can certainly count on foreign support ("Yes, end this already!"), and it will additionally allow Germany to start consolidating its new Eastern allies/puppets.
We must keep in mind that German war planning is not going to be some public debate.
Beyond that -- the main issue would be that all sides believe that they can and should(!) get at least something out of it. And once the war devolves into a muddy shitfight, everybody's committed and the sunk cost fallacy starts playing up. At that point, I see only the effective collapse of one power as sufficient to bring about the war's end (by giving a clear enough advantage to the other side).
In short: the war ends very quickly due to capable diplomacy, or it ends when one side wins.
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But to be fair, they also apply old solutions in new ways. So it evens out, more or less.
Meanwhile, in America, Christianity is the norm. When faced with external threats, common cause is found and internal divisions are (at least for a time) papered over. The ethnic divisions are actively being stoked up right now, but as I mentioned: that's a losing proposition. Earlier this week, I saw an article (I think Washington Post) describing non-white Trump supporters as "multi-ethic whiteness". A.k.a. "if you don't back the Democrats, you ain't black."
They'll keep pushing that, and eventually they're going to get the predictable outcome: a post-ethnic populist movement, united against the establishment. The Populares.
The Populares are the anti-establishment party. The establishment -- the side of the Optimates -- is neolib/neocon; globalist. Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, Mitt Romney, Mark Zuckerberg, Jack Dorsey... those are all names of establishment figures. Party lines as they exist now are mostly meaningless. Even whether one is a politician or not is mostly meaningless.
So who are the Populares? Well, you've seen the first glimpse of the movement. Trump shows what they'll be like. They key thing is not to mistake the person Trump for the ideas that appeal to his base. Trump has many faults, but the ideology underpinning his campaign -- the reason people voted for him -- is the early form of what the Populares will look like. An aggresive "Americanism" to oppose an aggressive globalism. That's the shape of the future conflict.
However, if I compare Trump to Gracchus, someone who thinks Trump is a huge dick might vehemently disagree with the assessment (provided that he does identify the Gracchi as genuine reformers). Note also that the left has traditionally claimed the Gracchi. But in reality, the Gracchi were very much populists, who catered to a socially conservative populace, and combined this with a programme of economic reforms. They were also considered to be despots, thugs and interlopers by the establishment. They spoke of tradition, but ignored key tenets of the Mos Maiorum. They spoke of the sanctity of Rome, but they wiped their asses with anything resembling constitutionalism. They incited mobs against opposing politicians.
In short: during their own day, they were seen much as Trump is seen now. Considering the outrageous stuff they got up to, certain condemnations are no less valid than present condemnations of actions Trump has taken. Nevertheless, they played a role in history. And after long centuries, we may conclude: perhaps, had they gotten it their way, a lot of later suffering might have been avoided. I don't consider it improbable that somewhere down the line, people end up saying "if only Trump had just won in 2020, a lot of the horrors could have been averted." It doesn't matter that Trump or the Gracchi were and are seriously flawed people. They swept into power for a reason, and that reason doesn't go away when you remove them. In fact... it only keeps getting worse.
As it stands now, what we are witnessing is a present-day counterpart to Tiberius Gracchus being killed, and his corpse being thrown into the Tiber. That's where we're at. Trump has been defeated, and he's been marked a despotic thug, and his followers are now all a bunch of nogoodniks by official fiat. What that means is the same thing the death of Tiberius Gracchus meant: over the coming years, the establishment tries to re-assert control and to stamp out the populist rabble. This will only deepen the existing divisions, and after a bit, we'll get "Trumpism mk. II" -- I'd say 2028 or 2032. Rome got that kind of thing, too, when Gaius Gracchus rose up a decade after his brother's murder.
Not that it helped any. They killed him, too. And this sequence of events would later be marked as the beginning of the end. This is where the Republic starts dying. Before too long, there will only be highly partisan sides, with no room for compromise. The politics of vengeance will reign supreme. You can see it from here. The establishment is champing at the bit to abolish the Electoral College and to pack the Supreme Court et cetera. hey'll do it, too. If not over the next years, then certainly after the next surge of populism breaks through. In so doing, they'll make civil war inevitable.
From a historical perspective, it's hard not to side with the Populares. In person, however, many of them will be very unpleasant towards any opponents they can get their hands on. But of course, the Optimates are no better.
In OTL, this was in a situation where the war had turned decidedly bitter and costly. The need to exact a high price was considered very pressing, because otherwise even a victory would be a defeat. (As, we may argue, it indeed was for the entente in OTL -- even though they tried to squeeze compensation out of Germany.)Possibly although OTL, at least as far as I'm aware there was no attempt at that OTL. Having won in the east Germany also went for what they thought would be a decisive victory in the west as well rather than seeking a white peace in the west or simply trying to wear down western attacks as an incentive to get such a peace.
A scenario where Germany has achieved its Eastern ambitions on a reasonable schedule, and has fought an effective defensive war in the West, allows for different considerations. To some extent requires it, even. It's now clear that the war is more expensive than what it's worth in prospective spoils. Germany is defensive in the West. If it wants real concessions, it needs to start winning. If it offers peace with honour, it may expect France to cave. The former approach has the additional risk that real German break-outs may icite Britain to enter after all. ("Must keep the Hun from the Channel at all costs!")
Given this, offering a white peace is by far the more attractive option here. It ends the war, it can certainly count on foreign support ("Yes, end this already!"), and it will additionally allow Germany to start consolidating its new Eastern allies/puppets.
As you noted yourself: the Germans didn't know what the French war plans actually were. The powers generally stumbled into this war rather blindly, going off assumptions rather than actual intel. Unless Germany is really dumb, I don't see Russia just getting access to the play-book in advance.That might be a factor if the Germans decide this some years before and make preparations for such a war, in terms of logistical support and the like. Of course since this is unlikely to be kept secret the Russians might well respond by upgrading their fortifications. Also they might do less to upgrade links into Russian Poland, accepting it might be lost and instead to defensive lines further back.
We must keep in mind that German war planning is not going to be some public debate.
I definitely think that until and unless France goes through Belgium, Britain will back France financially. But unless there's a good casus belli, I don't see a declaration of war on Germany happening.The German attack in Belgium definitely helped consolidate the Liberal party in support of the war, although a couple of ministers still resigned over the issue IIRC and also with Ireland. However concern about a single power dominating Europe like Germany desired would continue to be a major issue for many with knowledge of grand strategy and/or history and especially if the Germans have also been building up the HSF as a threat to Britain there will be great mistrust. Even before the war the Tories were arguing for an harder line including the introduction of conscription.
I agree. There would be pressure to end the war. However, it would require the powers at war to agree to come to the table. This did not happen in OTL when Wilson pushed for it. I'm not confident that the ATL "Great European War" would be ended by British mediation. It may help convince Germany to accept mediation if Britain actually commits to true neutrality right away, and doesn't help France in any way... but I don't see that happening.Yes if the French went through Belgium themselves it would cause major political problems. However if not at war Britain would anyway be pressurising all the powers for a quick end to the conflict, which wouldn't give time for the sort of conquests Germany desired.
Beyond that -- the main issue would be that all sides believe that they can and should(!) get at least something out of it. And once the war devolves into a muddy shitfight, everybody's committed and the sunk cost fallacy starts playing up. At that point, I see only the effective collapse of one power as sufficient to bring about the war's end (by giving a clear enough advantage to the other side).
In short: the war ends very quickly due to capable diplomacy, or it ends when one side wins.
Obviously, if the war doesn't break out, it doesn't break out. Geostrategic considerations help determine how you fight a major war, but only in the most extreme cases do they lead you to actively start one.Plus your considering WWI as Germany deciding "we need to defeat the allies and especially Russia before they get too strong" There is an argument that is why the Germany leadership seems to have been so eager for war in 1914 but what if they get no motive for conflict without the FF assassination? A blatant attack without an excuse would alienate the opinions of neutrals.
Elsewhere in posting here, I mentioned the Ukrainian heartland -- not all of Ukraine. I'm going off general German war aims here, and considering that there will certainly be nationalist insurrections. The prospect of partisan resistance against the Germans seems highly improbable to me. Or rather: it will be meaningless in comparison to the nationalist and anti-Russian (which means pro-German by default) insurrections. The Russian periphery was not kindly treated by Russia. They'll surely prefer being autonomous allies to a distant German hegemon over outright exploitation by Russia. (In fact, regardless of the fact that the economic set-up the Germans wished to create would exist to benefit Germany... it would also benefit its Eastern allies. And more than a little.)You do realise that this is a hell of a lot further than they went in WWI despite a major string of offensives in 1915, at least before the collapse of Russian moral and Lenin & Trotsky's insanity. Getting all of Ukraine, especially the heavy industry of the Donbas region is a huge ask given the much inferior ability for deep penetration in 1914 compared to 1941. Virtually no motorised or air resources, either for combat or supplies, weaker infrastructure, probably an harder opponent given the imperial forces will be more willing to fight for Russia than many of the Red Army were. Not to mention probably widespread partisan resistance. As I say its not impossible but how are the Germans going to supply forces as far as the Dnieper, let alone beyond it with foot infantry and supplies and artillery reliant on horses? While the Russians don't have to counter-attack other than when they think they have the Germans vulnerable or fatally over-extended. [Although no doubt there will be politically necessary counter-attacks.
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I agree in general about the long-term draw-backs of such governance. However, the conclusion is that the Russia I imagine would have problems compared to a hypothetical ideal Russia. Compared to the Soviet state of OTL, the problems would be... considerably reduced. "Better" is not "perfect", but it's still an improvement.[Russia] will still have considerable internal problems, especially under a continued Romanov autocracy or a right wing military type regime. Neither are good for establishing a powerful state in the modern age, at least in the longer term.
What I see, usually, is that people learn to make old mistakes in new ways.However doubtful that people are always incapable of learning from the past.
But to be fair, they also apply old solutions in new ways. So it evens out, more or less.
To the autochthonous population. Not to the Muslim immigrant population. The divide between the autochthonous European populace and the non-Western immigrant populations will not be effectively bridged. The only viable outcome is that one side wins. Meaning: either the Europeans expel/convert all Muslims, or the Muslims gain power and convert Europe to become Islamic. Stable co-existence is a utopian pipe-dream when both sides fundamentally want the other side to start being like them.Actually creed and especially religion plays a much smaller role in most of Europe than it does in the US.
Meanwhile, in America, Christianity is the norm. When faced with external threats, common cause is found and internal divisions are (at least for a time) papered over. The ethnic divisions are actively being stoked up right now, but as I mentioned: that's a losing proposition. Earlier this week, I saw an article (I think Washington Post) describing non-white Trump supporters as "multi-ethic whiteness". A.k.a. "if you don't back the Democrats, you ain't black."
They'll keep pushing that, and eventually they're going to get the predictable outcome: a post-ethnic populist movement, united against the establishment. The Populares.
I disagree with your assessment here. The supposed liberals are, at this point, firmly part of a globalist, cosmopolitan establishment. The established order. The elite. In other words: the incipient Optimates. They will never reform the system. They are the system. Look at who's getting booted off Facebook and Twitter and YouTube. Is that liberals? Nope. Okay, that means they're not the anti-establishment faction.By popular insurrection it sounds like you mean the deeper reaction against reform led by the business interests and religious fundamentalists? They, especially under Trump have mislead a lot of 'ordinary' people into thinking that their the solution rather than the primary problem. The main pressure for reform is actually from the definitely multi-racial liberals.
The Populares are the anti-establishment party. The establishment -- the side of the Optimates -- is neolib/neocon; globalist. Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, Mitt Romney, Mark Zuckerberg, Jack Dorsey... those are all names of establishment figures. Party lines as they exist now are mostly meaningless. Even whether one is a politician or not is mostly meaningless.
So who are the Populares? Well, you've seen the first glimpse of the movement. Trump shows what they'll be like. They key thing is not to mistake the person Trump for the ideas that appeal to his base. Trump has many faults, but the ideology underpinning his campaign -- the reason people voted for him -- is the early form of what the Populares will look like. An aggresive "Americanism" to oppose an aggressive globalism. That's the shape of the future conflict.
However, if I compare Trump to Gracchus, someone who thinks Trump is a huge dick might vehemently disagree with the assessment (provided that he does identify the Gracchi as genuine reformers). Note also that the left has traditionally claimed the Gracchi. But in reality, the Gracchi were very much populists, who catered to a socially conservative populace, and combined this with a programme of economic reforms. They were also considered to be despots, thugs and interlopers by the establishment. They spoke of tradition, but ignored key tenets of the Mos Maiorum. They spoke of the sanctity of Rome, but they wiped their asses with anything resembling constitutionalism. They incited mobs against opposing politicians.
In short: during their own day, they were seen much as Trump is seen now. Considering the outrageous stuff they got up to, certain condemnations are no less valid than present condemnations of actions Trump has taken. Nevertheless, they played a role in history. And after long centuries, we may conclude: perhaps, had they gotten it their way, a lot of later suffering might have been avoided. I don't consider it improbable that somewhere down the line, people end up saying "if only Trump had just won in 2020, a lot of the horrors could have been averted." It doesn't matter that Trump or the Gracchi were and are seriously flawed people. They swept into power for a reason, and that reason doesn't go away when you remove them. In fact... it only keeps getting worse.
As it stands now, what we are witnessing is a present-day counterpart to Tiberius Gracchus being killed, and his corpse being thrown into the Tiber. That's where we're at. Trump has been defeated, and he's been marked a despotic thug, and his followers are now all a bunch of nogoodniks by official fiat. What that means is the same thing the death of Tiberius Gracchus meant: over the coming years, the establishment tries to re-assert control and to stamp out the populist rabble. This will only deepen the existing divisions, and after a bit, we'll get "Trumpism mk. II" -- I'd say 2028 or 2032. Rome got that kind of thing, too, when Gaius Gracchus rose up a decade after his brother's murder.
Not that it helped any. They killed him, too. And this sequence of events would later be marked as the beginning of the end. This is where the Republic starts dying. Before too long, there will only be highly partisan sides, with no room for compromise. The politics of vengeance will reign supreme. You can see it from here. The establishment is champing at the bit to abolish the Electoral College and to pack the Supreme Court et cetera. hey'll do it, too. If not over the next years, then certainly after the next surge of populism breaks through. In so doing, they'll make civil war inevitable.
From a historical perspective, it's hard not to side with the Populares. In person, however, many of them will be very unpleasant towards any opponents they can get their hands on. But of course, the Optimates are no better.
I think Putin has prevented -- and is still preventing -- Russia from falling apart. Putin is far from perfect. So is Russia's situation. Once he's gone, we'll see just how much better -- or worse -- any successor will do. My bet is on worse. Much worse.Would say that Putin is more holding back/down Russia. Under his rule its stabilised a bit from the stupid policies under Yeltsin but that's been by increasing corruption and autocracy as well as decay and neglect across most of the country.