History Western Civilization, Rome and Cyclical History

[Skallagrim]

I'm going to limit my response a bit to leave aside points we've either fully discussed or which veer off into too much digression -- both to stay generally on-topic and to adhere to my own time constraints. Hope that's okay!

Possibly although OTL, at least as far as I'm aware there was no attempt at that OTL. Having won in the east Germany also went for what they thought would be a decisive victory in the west as well rather than seeking a white peace in the west or simply trying to wear down western attacks as an incentive to get such a peace.

In OTL, this was in a situation where the war had turned decidedly bitter and costly. The need to exact a high price was considered very pressing, because otherwise even a victory would be a defeat. (As, we may argue, it indeed was for the entente in OTL -- even though they tried to squeeze compensation out of Germany.)

A scenario where Germany has achieved its Eastern ambitions on a reasonable schedule, and has fought an effective defensive war in the West, allows for different considerations. To some extent requires it, even. It's now clear that the war is more expensive than what it's worth in prospective spoils. Germany is defensive in the West. If it wants real concessions, it needs to start winning. If it offers peace with honour, it may expect France to cave. The former approach has the additional risk that real German break-outs may icite Britain to enter after all. ("Must keep the Hun from the Channel at all costs!")

Given this, offering a white peace is by far the more attractive option here. It ends the war, it can certainly count on foreign support ("Yes, end this already!"), and it will additionally allow Germany to start consolidating its new Eastern allies/puppets.

That might be a factor if the Germans decide this some years before and make preparations for such a war, in terms of logistical support and the like. Of course since this is unlikely to be kept secret the Russians might well respond by upgrading their fortifications. Also they might do less to upgrade links into Russian Poland, accepting it might be lost and instead to defensive lines further back.

As you noted yourself: the Germans didn't know what the French war plans actually were. The powers generally stumbled into this war rather blindly, going off assumptions rather than actual intel. Unless Germany is really dumb, I don't see Russia just getting access to the play-book in advance.

We must keep in mind that German war planning is not going to be some public debate.

The German attack in Belgium definitely helped consolidate the Liberal party in support of the war, although a couple of ministers still resigned over the issue IIRC and also with Ireland. However concern about a single power dominating Europe like Germany desired would continue to be a major issue for many with knowledge of grand strategy and/or history and especially if the Germans have also been building up the HSF as a threat to Britain there will be great mistrust. Even before the war the Tories were arguing for an harder line including the introduction of conscription.

I definitely think that until and unless France goes through Belgium, Britain will back France financially. But unless there's a good casus belli, I don't see a declaration of war on Germany happening.

Yes if the French went through Belgium themselves it would cause major political problems. However if not at war Britain would anyway be pressurising all the powers for a quick end to the conflict, which wouldn't give time for the sort of conquests Germany desired.

I agree. There would be pressure to end the war. However, it would require the powers at war to agree to come to the table. This did not happen in OTL when Wilson pushed for it. I'm not confident that the ATL "Great European War" would be ended by British mediation. It may help convince Germany to accept mediation if Britain actually commits to true neutrality right away, and doesn't help France in any way... but I don't see that happening.

Beyond that -- the main issue would be that all sides believe that they can and should(!) get at least something out of it. And once the war devolves into a muddy shitfight, everybody's committed and the sunk cost fallacy starts playing up. At that point, I see only the effective collapse of one power as sufficient to bring about the war's end (by giving a clear enough advantage to the other side).

In short: the war ends very quickly due to capable diplomacy, or it ends when one side wins.

Plus your considering WWI as Germany deciding "we need to defeat the allies and especially Russia before they get too strong" There is an argument that is why the Germany leadership seems to have been so eager for war in 1914 but what if they get no motive for conflict without the FF assassination? A blatant attack without an excuse would alienate the opinions of neutrals.

Obviously, if the war doesn't break out, it doesn't break out. Geostrategic considerations help determine how you fight a major war, but only in the most extreme cases do they lead you to actively start one.

You do realise that this is a hell of a lot further than they went in WWI despite a major string of offensives in 1915, at least before the collapse of Russian moral and Lenin & Trotsky's insanity. Getting all of Ukraine, especially the heavy industry of the Donbas region is a huge ask given the much inferior ability for deep penetration in 1914 compared to 1941. Virtually no motorised or air resources, either for combat or supplies, weaker infrastructure, probably an harder opponent given the imperial forces will be more willing to fight for Russia than many of the Red Army were. Not to mention probably widespread partisan resistance. As I say its not impossible but how are the Germans going to supply forces as far as the Dnieper, let alone beyond it with foot infantry and supplies and artillery reliant on horses? While the Russians don't have to counter-attack other than when they think they have the Germans vulnerable or fatally over-extended. [Although no doubt there will be politically necessary counter-attacks.

Elsewhere in posting here, I mentioned the Ukrainian heartland -- not all of Ukraine. I'm going off general German war aims here, and considering that there will certainly be nationalist insurrections. The prospect of partisan resistance against the Germans seems highly improbable to me. Or rather: it will be meaningless in comparison to the nationalist and anti-Russian (which means pro-German by default) insurrections. The Russian periphery was not kindly treated by Russia. They'll surely prefer being autonomous allies to a distant German hegemon over outright exploitation by Russia. (In fact, regardless of the fact that the economic set-up the Germans wished to create would exist to benefit Germany... it would also benefit its Eastern allies. And more than a little.)


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[Russia] will still have considerable internal problems, especially under a continued Romanov autocracy or a right wing military type regime. Neither are good for establishing a powerful state in the modern age, at least in the longer term.

I agree in general about the long-term draw-backs of such governance. However, the conclusion is that the Russia I imagine would have problems compared to a hypothetical ideal Russia. Compared to the Soviet state of OTL, the problems would be... considerably reduced. "Better" is not "perfect", but it's still an improvement.

However doubtful that people are always incapable of learning from the past.

What I see, usually, is that people learn to make old mistakes in new ways.

But to be fair, they also apply old solutions in new ways. So it evens out, more or less.

Actually creed and especially religion plays a much smaller role in most of Europe than it does in the US.

To the autochthonous population. Not to the Muslim immigrant population. The divide between the autochthonous European populace and the non-Western immigrant populations will not be effectively bridged. The only viable outcome is that one side wins. Meaning: either the Europeans expel/convert all Muslims, or the Muslims gain power and convert Europe to become Islamic. Stable co-existence is a utopian pipe-dream when both sides fundamentally want the other side to start being like them.

Meanwhile, in America, Christianity is the norm. When faced with external threats, common cause is found and internal divisions are (at least for a time) papered over. The ethnic divisions are actively being stoked up right now, but as I mentioned: that's a losing proposition. Earlier this week, I saw an article (I think Washington Post) describing non-white Trump supporters as "multi-ethic whiteness". A.k.a. "if you don't back the Democrats, you ain't black."

They'll keep pushing that, and eventually they're going to get the predictable outcome: a post-ethnic populist movement, united against the establishment. The Populares.

By popular insurrection it sounds like you mean the deeper reaction against reform led by the business interests and religious fundamentalists? They, especially under Trump have mislead a lot of 'ordinary' people into thinking that their the solution rather than the primary problem. The main pressure for reform is actually from the definitely multi-racial liberals.

I disagree with your assessment here. The supposed liberals are, at this point, firmly part of a globalist, cosmopolitan establishment. The established order. The elite. In other words: the incipient Optimates. They will never reform the system. They are the system. Look at who's getting booted off Facebook and Twitter and YouTube. Is that liberals? Nope. Okay, that means they're not the anti-establishment faction.

The Populares are the anti-establishment party. The establishment -- the side of the Optimates -- is neolib/neocon; globalist. Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, Mitt Romney, Mark Zuckerberg, Jack Dorsey... those are all names of establishment figures. Party lines as they exist now are mostly meaningless. Even whether one is a politician or not is mostly meaningless.

So who are the Populares? Well, you've seen the first glimpse of the movement. Trump shows what they'll be like. They key thing is not to mistake the person Trump for the ideas that appeal to his base. Trump has many faults, but the ideology underpinning his campaign -- the reason people voted for him -- is the early form of what the Populares will look like. An aggresive "Americanism" to oppose an aggressive globalism. That's the shape of the future conflict.

However, if I compare Trump to Gracchus, someone who thinks Trump is a huge dick might vehemently disagree with the assessment (provided that he does identify the Gracchi as genuine reformers). Note also that the left has traditionally claimed the Gracchi. But in reality, the Gracchi were very much populists, who catered to a socially conservative populace, and combined this with a programme of economic reforms. They were also considered to be despots, thugs and interlopers by the establishment. They spoke of tradition, but ignored key tenets of the Mos Maiorum. They spoke of the sanctity of Rome, but they wiped their asses with anything resembling constitutionalism. They incited mobs against opposing politicians.

In short: during their own day, they were seen much as Trump is seen now. Considering the outrageous stuff they got up to, certain condemnations are no less valid than present condemnations of actions Trump has taken. Nevertheless, they played a role in history. And after long centuries, we may conclude: perhaps, had they gotten it their way, a lot of later suffering might have been avoided. I don't consider it improbable that somewhere down the line, people end up saying "if only Trump had just won in 2020, a lot of the horrors could have been averted." It doesn't matter that Trump or the Gracchi were and are seriously flawed people. They swept into power for a reason, and that reason doesn't go away when you remove them. In fact... it only keeps getting worse.

As it stands now, what we are witnessing is a present-day counterpart to Tiberius Gracchus being killed, and his corpse being thrown into the Tiber. That's where we're at. Trump has been defeated, and he's been marked a despotic thug, and his followers are now all a bunch of nogoodniks by official fiat. What that means is the same thing the death of Tiberius Gracchus meant: over the coming years, the establishment tries to re-assert control and to stamp out the populist rabble. This will only deepen the existing divisions, and after a bit, we'll get "Trumpism mk. II" -- I'd say 2028 or 2032. Rome got that kind of thing, too, when Gaius Gracchus rose up a decade after his brother's murder.

Not that it helped any. They killed him, too. And this sequence of events would later be marked as the beginning of the end. This is where the Republic starts dying. Before too long, there will only be highly partisan sides, with no room for compromise. The politics of vengeance will reign supreme. You can see it from here. The establishment is champing at the bit to abolish the Electoral College and to pack the Supreme Court et cetera. hey'll do it, too. If not over the next years, then certainly after the next surge of populism breaks through. In so doing, they'll make civil war inevitable.

From a historical perspective, it's hard not to side with the Populares. In person, however, many of them will be very unpleasant towards any opponents they can get their hands on. But of course, the Optimates are no better.

Would say that Putin is more holding back/down Russia. Under his rule its stabilised a bit from the stupid policies under Yeltsin but that's been by increasing corruption and autocracy as well as decay and neglect across most of the country.

I think Putin has prevented -- and is still preventing -- Russia from falling apart. Putin is far from perfect. So is Russia's situation. Once he's gone, we'll see just how much better -- or worse -- any successor will do. My bet is on worse. Much worse.

 

[Tiamat]

I'm going to limit my response a bit to leave aside points we've either fully discussed or which veer off into too much digression -- both to stay generally on-topic and to adhere to my own time constraints. Hope that's okay!



In OTL, this was in a situation where the war had turned decidedly bitter and costly. The need to exact a high price was considered very pressing, because otherwise even a victory would be a defeat. (As, we may argue, it indeed was for the entente in OTL -- even though they tried to squeeze compensation out of Germany.)

A scenario where Germany has achieved its Eastern ambitions on a reasonable schedule, and has fought an effective defensive war in the West, allows for different considerations. To some extent requires it, even. It's now clear that the war is more expensive than what it's worth in prospective spoils. Germany is defensive in the West. If it wants real concessions, it needs to start winning. If it offers peace with honour, it may expect France to cave. The former approach has the additional risk that real German break-outs may icite Britain to enter after all. ("Must keep the Hun from the Channel at all costs!")

Given this, offering a white peace is by far the more attractive option here. It ends the war, it can certainly count on foreign support ("Yes, end this already!"), and it will additionally allow Germany to start consolidating its new Eastern allies/puppets.


As you noted yourself: the Germans didn't know what the French war plans actually were. The powers generally stumbled into this war rather blindly, going off assumptions rather than actual intel. Unless Germany is really dumb, I don't see Russia just getting access to the play-book in advance.

We must keep in mind that German war planning is not going to be some public debate.


I definitely think that until and unless France goes through Belgium, Britain will back France financially. But unless there's a good casus belli, I don't see a declaration of war on Germany happening.


I agree. There would be pressure to end the war. However, it would require the powers at war to agree to come to the table. This did not happen in OTL when Wilson pushed for it. I'm not confident that the ATL "Great European War" would be ended by British mediation. It may help convince Germany to accept mediation if Britain actually commits to true neutrality right away, and doesn't help France in any way... but I don't see that happening.

Beyond that -- the main issue would be that all sides believe that they can and should(!) get at least something out of it. And once the war devolves into a muddy shitfight, everybody's committed and the sunk cost fallacy starts playing up. At that point, I see only the effective collapse of one power as sufficient to bring about the war's end (by giving a clear enough advantage to the other side).

In short: the war ends very quickly due to capable diplomacy, or it ends when one side wins.


Obviously, if the war doesn't break out, it doesn't break out. Geostrategic considerations help determine how you fight a major war, but only in the most extreme cases do they lead you to actively start one.


Elsewhere in posting here, I mentioned the Ukrainian heartland -- not all of Ukraine. I'm going off general German war aims here, and considering that there will certainly be nationalist insurrections. The prospect of partisan resistance against the Germans seems highly improbable to me. Or rather: it will be meaningless in comparison to the nationalist and anti-Russian (which means pro-German by default) insurrections. The Russian periphery was not kindly treated by Russia. They'll surely prefer being autonomous allies to a distant German hegemon over outright exploitation by Russia. (In fact, regardless of the fact that the economic set-up the Germans wished to create would exist to benefit Germany... it would also benefit its Eastern allies. And more than a little.)


--------------------------------------------------



I agree in general about the long-term draw-backs of such governance. However, the conclusion is that the Russia I imagine would have problems compared to a hypothetical ideal Russia. Compared to the Soviet state of OTL, the problems would be... considerably reduced. "Better" is not "perfect", but it's still an improvement.


What I see, usually, is that people learn to make old mistakes in new ways.

But to be fair, they also apply old solutions in new ways. So it evens out, more or less.


To the autochthonous population. Not to the Muslim immigrant population. The divide between the autochthonous European populace and the non-Western immigrant populations will not be effectively bridged. The only viable outcome is that one side wins. Meaning: either the Europeans expel/convert all Muslims, or the Muslims gain power and convert Europe to become Islamic. Stable co-existence is a utopian pipe-dream when both sides fundamentally want the other side to start being like them.

Meanwhile, in America, Christianity is the norm. When faced with external threats, common cause is found and internal divisions are (at least for a time) papered over. The ethnic divisions are actively being stoked up right now, but as I mentioned: that's a losing proposition. Earlier this week, I saw an article (I think Washington Post) describing non-white Trump supporters as "multi-ethic whiteness". A.k.a. "if you don't back the Democrats, you ain't black."

They'll keep pushing that, and eventually they're going to get the predictable outcome: a post-ethnic populist movement, united against the establishment. The Populares.


I disagree with your assessment here. The supposed liberals are, at this point, firmly part of a globalist, cosmopolitan establishment. The established order. The elite. In other words: the incipient Optimates. They will never reform the system. They are the system. Look at who's getting booted off Facebook and Twitter and YouTube. Is that liberals? Nope. Okay, that means they're not the anti-establishment faction.

The Populares are the anti-establishment party. The establishment -- the side of the Optimates -- is neolib/neocon; globalist. Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, Mitt Romney, Mark Zuckerberg, Jack Dorsey... those are all names of establishment figures. Party lines as they exist now are mostly meaningless. Even whether one is a politician or not is mostly meaningless.

So who are the Populares? Well, you've seen the first glimpse of the movement. Trump shows what they'll be like. They key thing is not to mistake the person Trump for the ideas that appeal to his base. Trump has many faults, but the ideology underpinning his campaign -- the reason people voted for him -- is the early form of what the Populares will look like. An aggresive "Americanism" to oppose an aggressive globalism. That's the shape of the future conflict.

However, if I compare Trump to Gracchus, someone who thinks Trump is a huge dick might vehemently disagree with the assessment (provided that he does identify the Gracchi as genuine reformers). Note also that the left has traditionally claimed the Gracchi. But in reality, the Gracchi were very much populists, who catered to a socially conservative populace, and combined this with a programme of economic reforms. They were also considered to be despots, thugs and interlopers by the establishment. They spoke of tradition, but ignored key tenets of the Mos Maiorum. They spoke of the sanctity of Rome, but they wiped their asses with anything resembling constitutionalism. They incited mobs against opposing politicians.

In short: during their own day, they were seen much as Trump is seen now. Considering the outrageous stuff they got up to, certain condemnations are no less valid than present condemnations of actions Trump has taken. Nevertheless, they played a role in history. And after long centuries, we may conclude: perhaps, had they gotten it their way, a lot of later suffering might have been avoided. I don't consider it improbable that somewhere down the line, people end up saying "if only Trump had just won in 2020, a lot of the horrors could have been averted." It doesn't matter that Trump or the Gracchi were and are seriously flawed people. They swept into power for a reason, and that reason doesn't go away when you remove them. In fact... it only keeps getting worse.

As it stands now, what we are witnessing is a present-day counterpart to Tiberius Gracchus being killed, and his corpse being thrown into the Tiber. That's where we're at. Trump has been defeated, and he's been marked a despotic thug, and his followers are now all a bunch of nogoodniks by official fiat. What that means is the same thing the death of Tiberius Gracchus meant: over the coming years, the establishment tries to re-assert control and to stamp out the populist rabble. This will only deepen the existing divisions, and after a bit, we'll get "Trumpism mk. II" -- I'd say 2028 or 2032. Rome got that kind of thing, too, when Gaius Gracchus rose up a decade after his brother's murder.

Not that it helped any. They killed him, too. And this sequence of events would later be marked as the beginning of the end. This is where the Republic starts dying. Before too long, there will only be highly partisan sides, with no room for compromise. The politics of vengeance will reign supreme. You can see it from here. The establishment is champing at the bit to abolish the Electoral College and to pack the Supreme Court et cetera. hey'll do it, too. If not over the next years, then certainly after the next surge of populism breaks through. In so doing, they'll make civil war inevitable.

From a historical perspective, it's hard not to side with the Populares. In person, however, many of them will be very unpleasant towards any opponents they can get their hands on. But of course, the Optimates are no better.


I think Putin has prevented -- and is still preventing -- Russia from falling apart. Putin is far from perfect. So is Russia's situation. Once he's gone, we'll see just how much better -- or worse -- any successor will do. My bet is on worse. Much worse.

Very detailed and thoughtful analysis.

In short? To know history, is to know the future...

 

[Lord Sovereign]

Very detailed and thoughtful analysis.

In short? To know history, is to know the future...

Whilst history never truly repeats, it does help one perceive patterns and possible outcomes of those patterns. I myself don't think the "American Republic" is going anywhere as its classical liberal roots are just too old and entrenched. It isn't quite like Rome in that it started as a Kingdom, nor does it have the woes expansion brought it (phone lines and railways solve governing vast tracks of land). If it does turn into a Principate, I'd expect it to be a hell of a lot more constitutional than the regime of Augustus. This American Emperor would be quite aware his throne sits atop the bayonets of the armed (and by then paranoid over big government) American public.

 

[Cherico]

Whilst history never truly repeats, it does help one perceive patterns and possible outcomes of those patterns. I myself don't think the "American Republic" is going anywhere as its classical liberal roots are just too old and entrenched. It isn't quite like Rome in that it started as a Kingdom, nor does it have the woes expansion brought it (phone lines and railways solve governing vast tracks of land). If it does turn into a Principate, I'd expect it to be a hell of a lot more constitutional than the regime of Augustus. This American Emperor would be quite aware his throne sits atop the bayonets of the armed (and by then paranoid over big government) American public.

Augustus reaches back 300 years when he creates the empire.

Thats actually a pretty good deal for us because while the 1800s had problems it gave a lot more rights to people then a lot of what came before and sadly gives a lot more rights then what we have now.

 

[Skallagrim]

Whilst history never truly repeats, it does help one perceive patterns and possible outcomes of those patterns. I myself don't think the "American Republic" is going anywhere as its classical liberal roots are just too old and entrenched. It isn't quite like Rome in that it started as a Kingdom, nor does it have the woes expansion brought it (phone lines and railways solve governing vast tracks of land). If it does turn into a Principate, I'd expect it to be a hell of a lot more constitutional than the regime of Augustus. This American Emperor would be quite aware his throne sits atop the bayonets of the armed (and by then paranoid over big government) American public.

I don't actually quite disagree. We must note that Augustus himself very vocally insisted that he was saving the Republic. We may see something similar. Of course, the West has an imperial archetype (Charlemagne). In ways that seem contradictory from a purely presentist position, it's entirely possible that the denizens of the 'Principate' end up deciding that 'imperium' and 'res publica' are not contradictory in any way.

I've previously suggested, half-jokingly, that just as all the Roman Emperors styled themselves 'Caesar', all of our future Emperors may style themselves 'Potus' (as in 'President of the United States').

Of course, even though the Romans held 'SPQR' aloft until the end, the Empire was by no means the old Republic anymore. And whatever the future holds -- whatever it gets called -- it won't be the Republic as we now know it.

 

[Megadeath]

Augustus reaches back 300 years when he creates the empire.

Thats actually a pretty good deal for us because while the 1800s had problems it gave a lot more rights to people then a lot of what came before and sadly gives a lot more rights then what we have now.

Well, that kinda depends on which person you talk about. There were plenty of people in the 1800's who enjoyed far fewer rights and freedoms than the average citizen today. In fact, the majority of people had more limits on their life, liberty and pursuit of happiness in that time than they do now.

It's also an almost childish oversimplification to suggest that any vague parallel with Roman history (And why is it always Roman history you guys look back to? China has thousands of years of history, do you think you can draw the same societal links there?) equates to some weird madlibs 1:1 symmetry.

Do you really think that there's an exact modern counterpart for each historical actor? That there will always be the same societal and political pressures, despite change in technology? In what way does it seem reasonable to you, to say "When Augustus ruled he was inspired by the rulers 3 centuries passed, so someone else who is exactly, perfectly, analogous to him will exist and likewise represent values 300 years out of date!"

Just the most basic examination of the scale of societal change shows how stupid that is. We are so much more different from our predecessors 300 years ago, compared to the societal gap across a similar time frame in ancient Rome.

 

[Skallagrim]

Perhaps you should actually read the thread before positing lots of false claims, @Megadeath. I realise it's thirteen pages by now, but you're asking would-be rhetorical questions that end up having been answered already.

For instance:

And why is it always Roman history you guys look back to? China has thousands of years of history, do you think you can draw the same societal links there?

Uh, yeah. I made some pretty extensive comparisons to (primarily) Chinese and Egyptian history throughout this thread.

Or this:

In what way does it seem reasonable to you, to say "When Augustus ruled he was inspired by the rulers 3 centuries passed, so someone else who is exactly, perfectly, analogous to him will exist and likewise represent values 300 years out of date!"

Directly tied to the preceding point: the fact that Han Gaozu and Thutmose III represent the same type of deliberate traditionalism rather makes the case. This has also been discussed already.

(Of course, the fact that you speak of values that are 300 years "out of date" hints at a considerable amount of presentism in your thinking. I'd urge you to examine that. Presentism blinds us.)

Or this:

Do you really think that there's an exact modern counterpart for each historical actor?

Literally everybody in this thread has repeatedly discussed the risks inherent in just that kind of equation. Such comprisons are shorthand for a comparison of the underlying trends. You'd know this if you'd read the discussion, instead of walking in and putting down comments that don't even apply to what others are saying.

Or this:

despite change in technology?

I have previously discussed this particular factor -- and its considerable lack of relevance -- in depth. Very shortly put: human nature remains human nature. The changing particulars don't really affect the unchanging universals. If you wish to discuss this further, however, I must insist that you first read my previous comments on this, as I refuse to needlessly repeat myself.

Or, of course, all this:

some weird madlibs 1:1 symmetry

It's also an almost childish oversimplification

an exact modern counterpart for each historical actor

Needless to say, your characterisations here aren't even remotely representative of what is being discussed in this thread. You're arguing a straw man. The only one guilty of childish oversimplifications, as it turns out, is you.


I don't particularly like being abrasive, but I have to say: right now, you come across as a troll, actively trying to shit up a discussion by posting poorly informed agitation/bait. If you want to meaningfully participate in discussion, I think you'll have to actually read what's been discussed already. Right now, you're only mucking up the thread with what effectively amounts to nonsense. I'll assume you don't intend it that way, but it does come across like that.

 

[Lord Sovereign]

Just to add to the earlier conversation, I actually reckon "Principate America" (if it came to pass) would more resemble the Parliamentary Monarchy of the yesteryear UK than anything else: a strong government headed by a strong executive, with nevertheless robust checks and balances in the form of constitutional heritage, independent courts, separate house of government, etcetera.

Granted, I don't think it would be the "United Kingdom of America", as like the Romans, Americans are quite hung up on "Kings." But it might be that in everything except name.

 

[Skallagrim]

Just to add to the earlier conversation, I actually reckon "Principate America" (if it came to pass) would more resemble the Parliamentary Monarchy of the yesteryear UK than anything else: a strong government headed by a strong executive, with nevertheless robust checks and balances in the form of constitutional heritage, independent courts, separate house of government, etcetera.

Granted, I don't think it would be the "United Kingdom of America", as like the Romans, Americans are quite hung up on "Kings." But it might be that in everything except name.

The American constitutional tradition derives from that of Britain/England, so the ties are obviously there. It'll be very interesting to see how such things develop. A thought that occurs to me is that what I expect for the rest of this century is -- essentially -- the US Constitution being torn to shreds. The 'Principate', in a way, markets itself as a return to the good old norms. In an American context, it's reasonable to assume this means constitutionalism, too.

Augustus painted himself as the agent of restoration, putting the mos maiorum and the constitutional arrangement of Rome back in the place of dignity from which they had been brutishly cast down. In reality, what he created was a new edifice, built from familiar remnants of the old. If it pleases those who object to exclusively Roman comparisons: the early Han dynasty did the same thing with the arrangements of state -- and even the tenets of sactioned philosophy -- and produced something that was actually new... but made from something old.

We must remember, restoring an ancient tradition is the exact opposite of creating something new and rootless. Even when you have made it up (partly or entirely). The effects are pretty much the same, but it's about legitimacy.

So. America. Applied there, I can imagine some things. Something that is called the Constitution, and which is said to be the same thing that existed previously, but which is in reality a new design, made from the shredded tatters of the old. Re-arranged where needed, with new additions in between, some old bits left out, and elegant glosses in the margins.

Imagine a 'greatest hits' volume of the entire tradition reaching back from the mediaeval 'Freedom of the City', through the Magna Carta, all the way up to the Constitution of the United States. The elegant process of amendment that the Americans use -- very Roman, by the way -- even lends itself to this kind of development with great facility.

What the Principate produces is never quite the 'return to the old' that it pretends to be. But it is, very much, the culmination of all that came before it. It provides context, and therefore, certainty.

 

[stevep]

I'm going to limit my response a bit to leave aside points we've either fully discussed or which veer off into too much digression -- both to stay generally on-topic and to adhere to my own time constraints. Hope that's okay!

Fine. I've trimmed a bit myself.

In OTL, this was in a situation where the war had turned decidedly bitter and costly. The need to exact a high price was considered very pressing, because otherwise even a victory would be a defeat. (As, we may argue, it indeed was for the entente in OTL -- even though they tried to squeeze compensation out of Germany.)

A scenario where Germany has achieved its Eastern ambitions on a reasonable schedule, and has fought an effective defensive war in the West, allows for different considerations. To some extent requires it, even. It's now clear that the war is more expensive than what it's worth in prospective spoils. Germany is defensive in the West. If it wants real concessions, it needs to start winning. If it offers peace with honour, it may expect France to cave. The former approach has the additional risk that real German break-outs may icite Britain to enter after all. ("Must keep the Hun from the Channel at all costs!")

Given this, offering a white peace is by far the more attractive option here. It ends the war, it can certainly count on foreign support ("Yes, end this already!"), and it will additionally allow Germany to start consolidating its new Eastern allies/puppets.

That is the logical thing to us but the leaders of the time there was a lot of social Darwinism and heated ideas plus some bloody stupid decisions made by all combatants in the war. If German did win fairly quickly, say within 18 months, in the east they might also still seek to permanently remove the French as a major force, as German plans for a post-war settlement were from pretty much Sept 1914. Plus if while their been fighting in the east the French have refined their tactics and operations and occupied much of Alsace-Lorraine say with the Rhine reached in a lot of places giving a good defensive position and have mopped up a fair chunk of the overseas German empire what if they refuse to accept a return to the pre-war borders in the west? The Germans, while tied up in the east would then have to consider putting themselves through a meat-grinder to try and get those territories back or to concede A-L possibly?

As you noted yourself: the Germans didn't know what the French war plans actually were. The powers generally stumbled into this war rather blindly, going off assumptions rather than actual intel. Unless Germany is really dumb, I don't see Russia just getting access to the play-book in advance.

We must keep in mind that German war planning is not going to be some public debate.

Actually I didn't say that. I said that to the best of my knowledge they wouldn't have known the French tactics, i.e. the insane plan 17 with massed assaults on fortifications, depending on elan to carry them, which cost the French so heavily in the early frontier battles.

I think the German knew the French would attack in A-L - doubly so in a Russia 1st German strategy as they would want to help their allies. Just as the French were pretty certain that the Germans were coming through Belgium and Luxembourg. They just expected the main German armies to come across the border somewhat further south rather than the right wing reaching the channel in the early stages. That's why they only have the relatively weak 5th army -and the expectation/hope of the BEF - to defend the northern part of the line. That the Germans were coming that way was clear from the massive construction of railways and stations in very thinly occupied border regions which were clearly for military deployment. Even without an spying or other successes I think the constructions for a drive east would similarly make clear that the Germans were planning on massive attacks against Russia, which would prompt the Russians to plan accordingly.

I definitely think that until and unless France goes through Belgium, Britain will back France financially. But unless there's a good casus belli, I don't see a declaration of war on Germany happening.

Its difficult to know what would be the most likely/definite triggers for a British dow. However any idea that Germany will clearly dominate the continent, even if their not immediately occupying the channel/low countries area will cause a lot of concern. Also if the Germans start USW, which is likely because their fleet will be limited by range from bases, that's likely to cause a lot of British shipping losses, whether their related to France or not. A British dow would be something that Germany would want to avoid but how much especially given how overconfident they might be. Considering how much they did to force a reluctant Wilson to declare war on them its uncertain if and under what circumstances Britain might intervene but definitely something that might have to be considered.

I agree. There would be pressure to end the war. However, it would require the powers at war to agree to come to the table. This did not happen in OTL when Wilson pushed for it. I'm not confident that the ATL "Great European War" would be ended by British mediation. It may help convince Germany to accept mediation if Britain actually commits to true neutrality right away, and doesn't help France in any way... but I don't see that happening.

Beyond that -- the main issue would be that all sides believe that they can and should(!) get at least something out of it. And once the war devolves into a muddy shitfight, everybody's committed and the sunk cost fallacy starts playing up. At that point, I see only the effective collapse of one power as sufficient to bring about the war's end (by giving a clear enough advantage to the other side).

In short: the war ends very quickly due to capable diplomacy, or it ends when one side wins.

Agree that the war either ends quickly, which means no one gets most of what they want, or when one side wins.

Elsewhere in posting here, I mentioned the Ukrainian heartland -- not all of Ukraine. I'm going off general German war aims here, and considering that there will certainly be nationalist insurrections. The prospect of partisan resistance against the Germans seems highly improbable to me. Or rather: it will be meaningless in comparison to the nationalist and anti-Russian (which means pro-German by default) insurrections. The Russian periphery was not kindly treated by Russia. They'll surely prefer being autonomous allies to a distant German hegemon over outright exploitation by Russia. (In fact, regardless of the fact that the economic set-up the Germans wished to create would exist to benefit Germany... it would also benefit its Eastern allies. And more than a little.)

Ah then what do you mean by the heartland of Ukraine? I think a lot of the developed farmlands was west of the Dnieper as, just is its capital Kiev. However even that's a long way for a 1914 army advancing from say Silesia or E Prussia.

Plus in this scenario its a case of a predominantly German invasion of the motherland. The Russian leadership didn't treat a lot of their minorities that well, or generally their population but the latter especially was par for the course and pretty much what was expected. Given the amount of social Darwinism on both sides the Slavic and Orthodox populations are going to be unhappy with German, non-Orthodox invaders, especially if/when the latter starts looting to make up for faltering logistics. There's also huge areas of territory where partisans, or simply people seeking to escape German control can hide. Coupled with the lack of real motorised vehicles let alone effective a/c there's going to be a lot of vulnerable supply lines which can be attacked. Also without the brutality of the Soviets not only might there be more people in many of those areas their likely to be a lot more hostile to invading forces. The railway lines, apart from I think being largely north-south which aren't ideal for an advance eastwards would need conversion to standard gauge and continuing guarding.

It will probably be a bit easier in Polish lands as the Germans were the 2nd least popular occupiers after the Austrians with the Russians 3rd but even so having a large army marching through your lands and probably doing a fair bit of looting is likely to cause tension.

Its possible, especially if the Russians are stupid enough to try and defend the Polish salient heavily, that they could lose say Poland, parts of Belarus and the southern Baltics fairly quickly but pushing deep into the empire and crossing the Dvina is going to be a more difficult task and pushing further east with lengthening supply lines is going to be a bloody operation.

What I see, usually, is that people learn to make old mistakes in new ways.

But to be fair, they also apply old solutions in new ways. So it evens out, more or less.

Very true. Never underestimate human capacity to snatch disaster from the jaws of success. I've seen enough of it in Britain in my own TL.

To the autochthonous population. Not to the Muslim immigrant population. The divide between the autochthonous European populace and the non-Western immigrant populations will not be effectively bridged. The only viable outcome is that one side wins. Meaning: either the Europeans expel/convert all Muslims, or the Muslims gain power and convert Europe to become Islamic. Stable co-existence is a utopian pipe-dream when both sides fundamentally want the other side to start being like them.

Meanwhile, in America, Christianity is the norm. When faced with external threats, common cause is found and internal divisions are (at least for a time) papered over. The ethnic divisions are actively being stoked up right now, but as I mentioned: that's a losing proposition. Earlier this week, I saw an article (I think Washington Post) describing non-white Trump supporters as "multi-ethic whiteness". A.k.a. "if you don't back the Democrats, you ain't black."

They'll keep pushing that, and eventually they're going to get the predictable outcome: a post-ethnic populist movement, united against the establishment. The Populares.

The problem is what happens to the substantial non-Christian population in the US? Both those who follow other established faiths [Islam, Judaism, Hinduism etc] and those who follow none?

Also while there are stupid levels of extremism on the hard left it doesn't have the size or brutality of that on the hard right, which is far more murderous.

I disagree with your assessment here. The supposed liberals are, at this point, firmly part of a globalist, cosmopolitan establishment. The established order. The elite. In other words: the incipient Optimates. They will never reform the system. They are the system. Look at who's getting booted off Facebook and Twitter and YouTube. Is that liberals? Nope. Okay, that means they're not the anti-establishment faction.

The Populares are the anti-establishment party. The establishment -- the side of the Optimates -- is neolib/neocon; globalist. Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, Mitt Romney, Mark Zuckerberg, Jack Dorsey... those are all names of establishment figures. Party lines as they exist now are mostly meaningless. Even whether one is a politician or not is mostly meaningless.

So who are the Populares? Well, you've seen the first glimpse of the movement. Trump shows what they'll be like. They key thing is not to mistake the person Trump for the ideas that appeal to his base. Trump has many faults, but the ideology underpinning his campaign -- the reason people voted for him -- is the early form of what the Populares will look like. An aggresive "Americanism" to oppose an aggressive globalism. That's the shape of the future conflict.

However, if I compare Trump to Gracchus, someone who thinks Trump is a huge dick might vehemently disagree with the assessment (provided that he does identify the Gracchi as genuine reformers). Note also that the left has traditionally claimed the Gracchi. But in reality, the Gracchi were very much populists, who catered to a socially conservative populace, and combined this with a programme of economic reforms. They were also considered to be despots, thugs and interlopers by the establishment. They spoke of tradition, but ignored key tenets of the Mos Maiorum. They spoke of the sanctity of Rome, but they wiped their asses with anything resembling constitutionalism. They incited mobs against opposing politicians.

In short: during their own day, they were seen much as Trump is seen now. Considering the outrageous stuff they got up to, certain condemnations are no less valid than present condemnations of actions Trump has taken. Nevertheless, they played a role in history. And after long centuries, we may conclude: perhaps, had they gotten it their way, a lot of later suffering might have been avoided. I don't consider it improbable that somewhere down the line, people end up saying "if only Trump had just won in 2020, a lot of the horrors could have been averted." It doesn't matter that Trump or the Gracchi were and are seriously flawed people. They swept into power for a reason, and that reason doesn't go away when you remove them. In fact... it only keeps getting worse.

As it stands now, what we are witnessing is a present-day counterpart to Tiberius Gracchus being killed, and his corpse being thrown into the Tiber. That's where we're at. Trump has been defeated, and he's been marked a despotic thug, and his followers are now all a bunch of nogoodniks by official fiat. What that means is the same thing the death of Tiberius Gracchus meant: over the coming years, the establishment tries to re-assert control and to stamp out the populist rabble. This will only deepen the existing divisions, and after a bit, we'll get "Trumpism mk. II" -- I'd say 2028 or 2032. Rome got that kind of thing, too, when Gaius Gracchus rose up a decade after his brother's murder.

Not that it helped any. They killed him, too. And this sequence of events would later be marked as the beginning of the end. This is where the Republic starts dying. Before too long, there will only be highly partisan sides, with no room for compromise. The politics of vengeance will reign supreme. You can see it from here. The establishment is champing at the bit to abolish the Electoral College and to pack the Supreme Court et cetera. hey'll do it, too. If not over the next years, then certainly after the next surge of populism breaks through. In so doing, they'll make civil war inevitable.

From a historical perspective, it's hard not to side with the Populares. In person, however, many of them will be very unpleasant towards any opponents they can get their hands on. But of course, the Optimates are no better.

I would have to disagree here. The elite, or Optimates in the Roman term are those who have a disproportionate amount of wealth and political influence. That is largely the reactionary elements centred around the Republicans. Their attracted a lot of poorer [mainly white, mainly male] elements who have suffered from that elites policies over the last few decades. So much so that many such people have both voted Republican even before Trump and also supported ideas that favour the elite at their expense.

Don't forget it was initially Reagan who pushed the conservative reaction of the 80's that was the point at which things really started falling apart for the country - just as with Thatcher in my own country. He pushed for more open trade at the same time as he was rubbishing the idea of maintaining US industry and increasing the imbalance in wealth and power, pushing the old trickle down myth. The democrats have been dragged rightwards so their probably in a similar sort of position to where Reagan was then but the wealthy magnates who dominate the establishment have gone even further rightwards to seek to maintain their power. Despite the fact their grasp on the country is driving it to ruin because they would rather stay powerful than allow competing ideas and people to emerge.

You mention about the demonisation of a lot of the right but then think how much of the same they have done in recent decades? Obama's attempts at medical reform to provide reliable health care was continually impeded by the elites and derided as 'socialism' because while it would be much cheaper for the country it would do so by threatening the profits of the insurance companies. Ditto with the ideas of equal opportunity and the ending of brutal race murders. Think if how Trump, backed by virtually all the Republican hierarchy until the last week or so sought to insult and abuse anyone who dared to have a different opinion. It goes back as far as the fanatics of the tea-party who really increased the level of personal abuse of opponents and pushed for the dog in the manger tactics of blocking anything the Democrats proposed simply because it was proposed by them regardless of merit. The Republicans have managed to pack the Supreme Court by partisan action but as recent events show it doesn't mean that will support them regardless.

Also don't forget that the right is losing ground demographically. Clinton won more votes than Trump in 2016, despite a fair number of people being blocked from voting. Biden won an even larger margin despite Trump fooling a lot of people into voting for him regardless of the harm his policies did them. Many of those as well as moderate Republicans are having doubts about the path that he's pushed since the attack on the Senate and its only likely to get worse for the Republicans until their willing to consider moving back towards the centre.

I think Putin has prevented -- and is still preventing -- Russia from falling apart. Putin is far from perfect. So is Russia's situation. Once he's gone, we'll see just how much better -- or worse -- any successor will do. My bet is on worse. Much worse.

Again we have to disagree here. Putin is blocking any reform or change and allowing other oligarchs to loot the country while its infrastructure and people are allowed to fall increasingly behind. There's not the same inflation but violence is now different only really in that he's nationalised it. Its an extreme form of what's happening in the west. If Russia can only stagger on with a thuggish autocrat who bleeds the country white then I would argue it needs change so it can start repairing the damage of the last century. That definitely won't happen under Putin because he's only concerned with his personal power and thanks to his training as a terrorist he can only think of maintaining that by brutality and fear.

 

[Morphic Tide]

Very shortly put: human nature remains human nature. The changing particulars don't really affect the unchanging universals.

Except that human nature alone doesn't generate the damn Roman Empire, you have to have fairly particular combinations of social factors going on to get that going, and the simple fact of the matter is that so many of the requirements with regard to resource paradigms or political organization schemes do not exist anymore. The major accepted example of this in the Chinese dynastic cycle very notably underwent vanishingly little change from the start of the Confucian bureaucracy to Mao.

You keep hammering away at drawing parallels to Rome a whole two millennia ago. Very broad structural features like you're talking about have never repeated in European history, because the fundamental economic and/or political structure has been overhauled in-between supposed "cycles" fundamentally altering very basic aspects of the results to the point of rendering comparisons farcical. Feudalism was not how Ancient Greece operated, and modern Capitalism differs greatly from Roman economics.

The inheritance laws and nature of economics that Charlemagne lived in fundamentally prevented the formation of a lasting empire at all like the Romans had, instead creating feudalism as we think of it, which is extremely different from the form of fragmentation that afflicted the Macedonian Empire and had genuinely direct successor states contiguous for much longer. To compare Charlemagne's relation to the modern US to Alexander's relation to the late Roman Republic is simply absurd.

Roman imperial economics were founded on paying soldiers in conquered land, creating an actual reason to expand. Something starkly absent in modern times, where industry is so interconnected and expensive that the US bought its hegemony by bankrolling rebuilding after the World Wars, making military conquest actively economically harmful so genuinely making an empire would be strictly detrimental by most any material measure, and the one country that'd be capable of it at the moment is also the one country that can just fuck off and run everything internally.

 

[CastilloVerde]

To compare Charlemagne's relation to the modern US to Alexander's relation to the late Roman Republic is simply absurd.

@Skallagrim never did this though. I encourage you to read his very first post in this thread: link where he makes a comparison between the roles that Charlemagne and the Carolingian disintegration function in Western civilization to what Agamemnon and the Greek Dark Ages function in Classical civilization within the wider macrohistorical view of civilizational analysis.

Also, direct one-on-one comparisons is, as @Skallagrim mentioned earlier in this thread, rarely useful. It's not the historical figure or specific polity that will be repeated in history, but the underlying ideas that these things function in a civilization's history. I assume that the disagreement comes from, among other reasons, a fundamental difference among those who tend towards a materialistic interpretation of history from an idealistic one.

I know the thread has 'cyclical history' in the title. But it's important to understand that history doesn't repeat exactly.

It might help to think of a wheel moving forward. All edges of the wheel will eventually touch the ground again, but the edges will not hit the same point of the ground it did before.

 

[Morphic Tide]

@Skallagrim never did this though. I encourage you to read his very first post in this thread: link where he makes a comparison between the roles that Charlemagne and the Carolingian disintegration function in Western civilization to what Agamemnon and the Greek Dark Ages function in Classical civilization within the wider macrohistorical view of civilizational analysis.

Really can't find myself to be bothered rereading thousands upon thousands of words of somebody basically ignoring all the structural differences to focus on trying to shoe-horn modern events into being the grand total of the second iteration of a cycle over the literal entirety of recorded history, and back into flat-out mythology.

As it is, the considerable bulk of what's been written here has been comparing Rome to the United States, and you right here are comparing literal mythology of a Trojan War figure who's actions are oral traditions carried through those same Dark Ages to Charlemagne's actions in a paradigm with all the spectacular differences the Pope introduces, and furthermore need to compare the disintegration processes to somehow draw useful parallels between the formalization of Feudalism and what I assume to be the Bronze Age Collapse.

For those broad strokes of Trump being a Gracchi Brother to be remotely useful, you have to be able to meaningfully compare the Roman economic system that the Gracchi Brothers tried to work on de-stratifying by way of directly transferring ownership of land to the modern American economic system of things being limited primarily by labor instead of land or resources to work on, and those Roman veterans and plebeians to the modern US military and rural population.

Human nature doesn't exist in a vacuum, and modern societies have such a vast number of differences from historic examples that incredibly basic patterns have been broken for over a century. The basic structure of family has disintegrated for the general public. Self-sufficiency is functionally nonexistent in the Western world because everything relies on mass industry. Military conquest doesn't work anymore because any meaningful conflict will ruin the very industry you'd need to make it worth something, as we saw very clearly with the World Wars before precision guided munitions and inter-continental ballistic missiles were on the table.

Let's assume the United States does get a Caesar figure. How do they get Canada or Mexico to become part of the "Western Empire"? How do they accomplish this without collapsing the United States from the cost of bringing them remotely up to par and hold onto them through the obvious period of resistance? How do you get from a populist uprising anywhere in the world to a new empire, by any means?

 

[Cherico]

Really can't find myself to be bothered rereading thousands upon thousands of words of somebody basically ignoring all the structural differences to focus on trying to shoe-horn modern events into being the grand total of the second iteration of a cycle over the literal entirety of recorded history, and back into flat-out mythology.

As it is, the considerable bulk of what's been written here has been comparing Rome to the United States, and you right here are comparing literal mythology of a Trojan War figure who's actions are oral traditions carried through those same Dark Ages to Charlemagne's actions in a paradigm with all the spectacular differences the Pope introduces, and furthermore need to compare the disintegration processes to somehow draw useful parallels between the formalization of Feudalism and what I assume to be the Bronze Age Collapse.

For those broad strokes of Trump being a Gracchi Brother to be remotely useful, you have to be able to meaningfully compare the Roman economic system that the Gracchi Brothers tried to work on de-stratifying by way of directly transferring ownership of land to the modern American economic system of things being limited primarily by labor instead of land or resources to work on, and those Roman veterans and plebeians to the modern US military and rural population.

Human nature doesn't exist in a vacuum, and modern societies have such a vast number of differences from historic examples that incredibly basic patterns have been broken for over a century. The basic structure of family has disintegrated for the general public. Self-sufficiency is functionally nonexistent in the Western world because everything relies on mass industry. Military conquest doesn't work anymore because any meaningful conflict will ruin the very industry you'd need to make it worth something, as we saw very clearly with the World Wars before precision guided munitions and inter-continental ballistic missiles were on the table.

Let's assume the United States does get a Caesar figure. How do they get Canada or Mexico to become part of the "Western Empire"? How do they accomplish this without collapsing the United States from the cost of bringing them remotely up to par and hold onto them through the obvious period of resistance? How do you get from a populist uprising anywhere in the world to a new empire, by any means?

Human nature doesnt exist in a vacuum this is correct, but an important fact of life is action and reaction. The interaction of these things over a period of hundreds of years across many different civlization's shows patterns of how these action and reactions. That is the central hypothasis being explained.

You are not engaging with the ideas in question, and to be perfectly honest I get why. Because if said hypothasis is true you and I are going to die horrible violent deaths.

In a time of extreme political tension people like us do not do well. We say the wrong thing and then get killed by violent mobs of people, or get disapeered or any other number of things. Some people thrive in these conditions others die horribly. You and I we are in the die horribly camp.

That is not a fun thing to contemplate or accept far easier to say this time its different or we are special. My advice take more time to talk to your friends and loved ones, live your life as best you can and accept that one day for reasons outside of your control some one will try to kill you.

I know its sucks but I and many others are in the same shitty boat.

 

[Navarro]

@Skallagrim did say that the Optimate/Populares split would cut across current party lines.

 

[Navarro]

Let's assume the United States does get a Caesar figure. How do they get Canada or Mexico to become part of the "Western Empire"? How do they accomplish this without collapsing the United States from the cost of bringing them remotely up to par and hold onto them through the obvious period of resistance? How do you get from a populist uprising anywhere in the world to a new empire, by any means?

One should note that:

A: American domestic politics are seemingly starting to merge with those of the general 'Western cultural sphere'.
B: @Skallagrim estimates that there will be another military crisis in Europe which America will intervene in.
C: America is at the centre of a network of institutions - NATO, the Five Eyes, etc. - which might well be the 'scaffolding' of the Western Empire if it comes about.
D: If A. is true, and American politics go through the tumultous phase which Skallagrim predicted, the political disorder and strife will be contagious and spread to the rest of the 'Western sphere' (which will then lead to the military intervention mentioned in B.), much as the internal politics of Rome caused wars across the Mediterranean world.
E. Territories need not be directly annexed to be part of 'the Empire' at first. We could see something more like de jure-independent vassal states which jump when Washington asks 'how high' (large portions of the early Roman Empire were similarly composed of client states).

Just to add to the earlier conversation, I actually reckon "Principate America" (if it came to pass) would more resemble the Parliamentary Monarchy of the yesteryear UK than anything else: a strong government headed by a strong executive, with nevertheless robust checks and balances in the form of constitutional heritage, independent courts, separate house of government, etcetera.

The "Emperor" would most likely still be elected in some fashion and probably will be called "President". One must remember that during the Principate the forms of the Republic were still extant, and local government was still elected according to Roman custom (the first Emperors after Augustus even tried to hand power back to the Senate, which was unwilling to take it).

 

[Navarro]

An interesting book review on the potential form the future may take:

The Long View: Empires of Trust: How Rome Built -- and America Is Building -- a New World By Thomas F. Madden — With Both Hands

I love this quote: [Madden] is well aware that aspects of their societies that seem similar are often quite different in spirit and function. The dustjacket sports an photograph of the US Senate and a dramatic rendering of Cicero addressing the Roman Senate; both bodies were called a “senate,” but

www.benespen.com

 

[DocSolarisReich]

So I had some thoughts on the nature of history and the impact of Rome on Western Civilization. I personally believe that all of Western Civilization is in essence Rome and then after its fall people recreating it or taking aspects of it. Rome went from kingdom, to Republic, to Empire under a Caesar. In that same sense after the fall of Rome you had Kingdoms, and then a transition into Republican forms of government across the west, which to me seems naturally empire under a Caesar type figure would then follow.

The crystallization of a living kultur into its final zivilizational phase is the winter of that precedes the final collapse of forms that leads to the rise of a new kultur from the ruins of the Ecumenical Empire. Modernity has an expiration date. Thank god.

 

[The One Char]

Human nature doesnt exist in a vacuum this is correct, but an important fact of life is action and reaction. The interaction of these things over a period of hundreds of years across many different civlization's shows patterns of how these action and reactions. That is the central hypothasis being explained.

You are not engaging with the ideas in question, and to be perfectly honest I get why. Because if said hypothasis is true you and I are going to die horrible violent deaths.

In a time of extreme political tension people like us do not do well. We say the wrong thing and then get killed by violent mobs of people, or get disapeered or any other number of things. Some people thrive in these conditions others die horribly. You and I we are in the die horribly camp.

That is not a fun thing to contemplate or accept far easier to say this time its different or we are special. My advice take more time to talk to your friends and loved ones, live your life as best you can and accept that one day for reasons outside of your control some one will try to kill you.

I know its sucks but I and many others are in the same shitty boat.

It is rather depressing. Anyway to avoid it?

 

[Cherico]

It is rather depressing. Anyway to avoid it?

From what i've seen really no.

Human beings have a tendency to want to learn everything the hard way, the good news is that lessons learned the hard way tend to stick, the bad news is that the process sucks balls.