Alternate History Could Operation Barbarossa had been succesful megathread

[stevep]

Crap, the forum ate my reply. Alright I'll have to redo a shorter version.

I'm explaining the causes that have been left out of the standard narrative in response to a specific question about the role of food motivating the Holocaust. That doesn't mean Nazi racism didn't play a role, but if it were the sole motivating cause they would have immediately genocided the 3 million Polish Jews in 1939 rather than waiting until 1942. So clearly Nazi racism or general evilness wasn't the main motivating cause, otherwise why wait until after invading the USSR?


Which is false, because 3 million Polish Jews were in German hands as of 1939, but they weren't targeted for extermination until 1942. Prior to that point the main cause of death of Polish Jews was starvation or illness related to starvation.
As I've already provided the sources for even the Einsatzgruppen massacres of 1941 were linked to the food shortages that existed before the invasion (the invasion itself was predicated on seizing food, among other resources, per Hitler's own words). The standard narrative about racism being the main driver of the murders doesn't hold up given the timeline of events; all it explains is who was targeted for murder. The main driver of the planned massacres was the shortage of food:

Auschwitz

www.fpp.co.uk

I'm doubtful of the accuracy of that. Many of the Jews were in the eastern part of the country that fell under Soviet rule.

Also the decision to murder Jews wholesale during the invasion of the Soviet Union was made before the invasion started. Yes the decision to invade the Soviet Union worsened the food position inside the German empire but that was Hitler's decision. Furthermore the widespread looting and disorder as a result of the German occupation, all over the regions affected wouldn't have helped either. The fact that Britain was seeking to deny resources to Germany was a factor but again that was due to Hitler's decision. Given the steps taken to strave out Britain in turn why should Britain be expected to allow food supplies to Germany?

That's the thing, the Jews rounded up were divided into those who were economically useful and those who weren't. By 1944 the only remaining Jews outside of Nazi control were those of Hungary and Romania who still had economic resources which were stolen and used to pay for the war, while Jews who could be worked were sent to camps to act as labor. Everyone else deemed useless was killed in some fashion because food didn't exist to feed them. That meant ultimately that the Holocaust turned a profit for the Nazis, as it got them labor, killed people who weren't deemed useful and didn't then need to be fed, and of course meant all their accumulated resources were available for plunder.

Hungarian Jews were robbed, which was profitable, sent to work if they could, which was profitable as the Germans badly needed labor as they were out of their own men, and removed those who couldn't work who now didn't need to be fed so there was more food for others. It is an horrific logic, but is utilitarianism taken to the extreme.

And then when the ones who couldn't work were killed they concentrated on killing the working Jews.

 

[sillygoose]

I'm doubtful of the accuracy of that. Many of the Jews were in the eastern part of the country that fell under Soviet rule.

The majority were in the German zone. At least 2/3rds.

Also the decision to murder Jews wholesale during the invasion of the Soviet Union was made before the invasion started.

Incorrect, the first Einsatzgruppen murder happened on July 30th and the order was issued on July 8th by Heydrich. The pre-invasion murder list was limited to Commissars and Communist party officials.

Einsatzgruppen - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

On 8 July, Heydrich announced that all Jews were to be regarded as partisans, and gave the order for all male Jews between the ages of 15 and 45 to be shot.[66] On 17 July Heydrich ordered that the Einsatzgruppen were to murder all Jewish Red Army prisoners of war, plus all Red Army prisoners of war from Georgia and Central Asia, as they too might be Jews.[67]

Yes the decision to invade the Soviet Union worsened the food position inside the German empire but that was Hitler's decision. Furthermore the widespread looting and disorder as a result of the German occupation, all over the regions affected wouldn't have helped either. The fact that Britain was seeking to deny resources to Germany was a factor but again that was due to Hitler's decision.

Of course.

Given the steps taken to strave out Britain in turn why should Britain be expected to allow food supplies to Germany?

Britain started the starvation game in both world wars and was nasty enough to intensify it during the negotiations for the ToV to force acceptance despite all the civilians it killed. The reason Britain should have allowed Hoover's food relief orgs to work is because they got the food where it needed to go, starving civilians, rather than the Germans and ultimately because the Nazis were going to ensure their people ate first; Britain (and later the US) had to know that their policy was making innocent civilians in occupied countries pay the price since there were a bunch of news articles I've been able to find from the time about it and Hoover was quite public criticizing the decision to cut off food relief for said civilians. It should have been about humanitarianism, as that was the reason the Allies were fighting the Nazis.

And then when the ones who couldn't work were killed they concentrated on killing the working Jews.

They generally were not targeted if there was food to feed them as their labor was too valuable.

 

[WolfBear]

The majority were in the German zone. At least 2/3rds.

I've previously seen figures of about 2 million Jews in the German zone of Poland and about 1.3 million Jews in the Soviet zone of Poland. Though this doesn't include Jewish refugees who moved from German Poland to Soviet Poland, so maybe you'd have something like 1.5-1.6 million Jews in Soviet Poland.

Probably around 55-60% of the total Jews in Poland were in the German zone. So, a bit less than two-thirds.

 

[sillygoose]

I've previously seen figures of about 2 million Jews in the German zone of Poland and about 1.3 million Jews in the Soviet zone of Poland. Though this doesn't include Jewish refugees who moved from German Poland to Soviet Poland, so maybe you'd have something like 1.5-1.6 million Jews in Soviet Poland.

Probably around 55-60% of the total Jews in Poland were in the German zone. So, a bit less than two-thirds.

That is basically what I've seen as well, thanks for the numbers.

 

[WolfBear]

That is basically what I've seen as well, thanks for the numbers.

Yeah.

Yitzhak Arad's book The Holocaust in the Soviet Union provides some data for this for Soviet Poland, as does this article for German Poland:

http://rcin.org.pl/Content/15652/WA51_13607_r2011-nr12_Monografie.pdf

From page 191 in the link right above:

Poland west of the Curzon Line had 2.254 million Jews in 1939, whereas Poland east of the Curzon Line had 1.103 million Jews in 1939. However, Poland west of the Curzon Line here means up to the Oder-Neisse Line, so some German Jews would also be included here. So, maybe 2.1-2.2 million Polish Jews west of the Curzon Line in total. But move around 0.3-0.4 million Jewish refugees from German/western Poland to Soviet/eastern Poland, and you get 1.7-1.9 million Jews in German/western Poland and 1.4-1.5 million Jews in Soviet/eastern Poland.

 

[themarcksplan]

I'm continually amazed by the persistence/vehemence of online and (to a much lesser extent) academic belief that Germany could not have defeated the Soviet Union.

99% of commentary on the topic focuses on the wrong issue. It bickers about Moscow vs. Ukraine in 1941, for example, rather than exploring alternate outcomes had Germany avoided the bedrock mistake of assuming that conquering the world's largest army and country would take just a few weeks/months.

Making Barbarossa succeed is actually quite easy and doesn't rely on "Notzis." All it requires is that Germany prepare for a two-summer campaign to the Urals, in case the SU doesn't collapse immediately (i.e. it wasn't a ludicrous expectation but was an incompetent assumption). Vicious racism and a belief that your opponents are capable of sustained resistance are entirely reconcilable - indeed Hitler held both viewpoints re the SU but didn't resolve the contradiction.

What does this look like? I've laid out one version here. Main points:

• 1. Germany expects a decent fight in Russia, therefore doesn't slash its army production after France and during/before Barbarossa.
• 2. Because Germany must prepare for residual war in the SU and Anglo-American intervention in 1942 (a "1.2-front war") it mobilizes its resources - including occupied Europe - to a greater extent.
• Because Germany is not assuming only residual Soviet forces after the Border Battles, it prepares an adequate logistical basis for Barbarossa by doing exactly what it did in 1942: invest in sustainable rail operations rather than merely regauging Soviet railways in slipshod basis. Regauging was done very quickly and didn't slow the German army much, contrary to many stupid histories. What mattered much more was failure to build a rail system of decent capacity and weather-resilience - something that Germany rapidly fixed after the Moscow '41 crisis revealed the utter stupidity of Nazi/Wehrmacht plans.
• As a result of (1) and (2), Germany has slightly stronger forces in mid-1941. At a minimum, it has an extra panzer group (say 8-10 mechanized divisions) when Barbarossa launches.
• Germany uses its extra panzer group to destroy Soviet Southwest Front during the Border Battles via a pincer from Southern Poland and Northern Romania. As a result, RKKA cannot oppose Army Group Center as strongly during the Battle of Smolensk. Neither does Germany have to choose between Moscow and Ukraine; it can conquer both simultaneously. The need to reconstitute defenses of Moscow-Gorkiy and of Southern Russia repeatedly denude RKKA of the ability to defend Leningrad, which falls as well after Army Group North meets the Finns on the Svir during ~September 1941.
• Having lost the regions of Moscow-Gorkiy, Leningrad-Vologda, and the vast grain belt between Voronezh and Krasnodar in the first year of the war, the SU has ~40% of OTL population in 1942 and proportionately less fuel/food/industry. Its ATL army is therefore >40% weaker and Germany is able to push to the Central Urals by Fall 1942. After that the SU is a Spain/Turkey-level power that either accepts a harsh peace or is cordoned/conquered by a relatively small residual Ostheer (and a Japan that no longer fears the rump SU).

That Germany could have defeated the SU doesn't diminish the heroism of Soviet struggle - exactly the opposite. The enormous sacrifices required to defeat Germany boggle the imagination; those who pretend the SU was a limitless font of soldiers and resources belittle Soviet heroism that far exceeded anything remotely attempted in the West (and I suspect such belittlement is the point of a Cold War-inflected historiography).

IMO the main point of counterfactual analysis is to expose historical bullshit, not to spool out elaborate alternate universes. I don't know what today's world would have looked like had Barbarossa succeeded, though those discussions are also interesting (that the Allies could have won a conventional war is risible, IMJ).

The historical bullshit at which this counterfactual aims is the post-Munich recovery of the West. In conventional telling, "we" almost waited too long to do the right thing and fight Hitler. There's no almost. Had Communism not defeated Fascism, no Western liberation of Europe was feasible except perhaps via an atomic holocaust that was (1) not part of Western strategy until 1944-45 and therefore no excuse for abject failure when the West met most of German strength and (2) would likely have been nearly as horrific as Nazi victory.

I'll add another bullshit history target: actual Wehraboos who think the German army and its brilliant generals would have won but for Hitler. Halder and his gang of uber-racist (but not quite Hitler-evil) goons were even more convinced than Hitler that Barbarossa would be a quick saunter to Moscow. While Germany should (militarily) have defeated the SU, only a military as ideologically/racially blinded as the WW2 Wehrmacht would seriously have planned a campaign to decide the invasion of Russia/SU in mere weeks (and would have written in a diary - as did Halder - that the campaign was already decided in July '41). More bullshit in the fact that the US Army gave Halder a fucking medal after the war, when we were more concerned with former Nazi help in the Cold War than with learning the lessons of the last one (small wonder we had our own imperial delusions and humiliations around the globe?).

 

[Lord Sovereign]

Seriously, the Germans came dangerously close to winning on the Eastern Front. Stalin was all but prepared to flee Moscow when the Wehrmacht was knocking on his door.

In that respect, Hitler was right. The USSR was a rotting edifice that only needed its door to be kicked down...unfortunately, however, when you give an entire ethnic group the option of extinction or victory, they tend to put up a much harder fight than they would have otherwise. Let's not discount how observance of the rules of war might have lead to a full on Soviet Collapse very quickly.

 

[Sol Zagato]

Seriously, the Germans came dangerously close to winning on the Eastern Front. Stalin was all but prepared to flee Moscow when the Wehrmacht was knocking on his door.

In that respect, Hitler was right. The USSR was a rotting edifice that only needed its door to be kicked down...unfortunately, however, when you give an entire ethnic group the option of extinction or victory, they tend to put up a much harder fight than they would have otherwise. Let's not discount how observance of the rules of war might have lead to a full on Soviet Collapse very quickly.

IIRC, it was as late as 43 or 44, after it was clear the Germans were losing, an entire central Asian brigade attempted to defect across the lines (was detected and put down)

They really could have taken advantage of discontent.

 

[bintananth]

IIRC, it was as late as 43 or 44, after it was clear the Germans were losing, an entire central Asian brigade attempted to defect across the lines (was detected and put down)

They really could have taken advantage of discontent.

If the Nazi's weren't genocidal and racisist assholes they probably could have won by saying "Freedom, Liberty, and Equality" as they marched through.

 

[ATP]

Seriously, the Germans came dangerously close to winning on the Eastern Front. Stalin was all but prepared to flee Moscow when the Wehrmacht was knocking on his door.

In that respect, Hitler was right. The USSR was a rotting edifice that only needed its door to be kicked down...unfortunately, however, when you give an entire ethnic group the option of extinction or victory, they tend to put up a much harder fight than they would have otherwise. Let's not discount how observance of the rules of war might have lead to a full on Soviet Collapse very quickly.

Indeed.There was even worker uprising in Moscow against soviets.And there is excellent book by Jurgen Thorwald " The Illusion - soviets soldiers in Hitler armies" - 4 millions of soldiers surrender to german almost without fight in 1941 - they murdered most of them,instead of use against Sralin.Even after that,one million of survivors served in Wermacht in 1942 without Hitler knowledge.

 

[themarcksplan]

In that respect, Hitler was right. The USSR was a rotting edifice that only needed its door to be kicked down

4 millions of soldiers surrender to german almost without fight in 1941

They put up a fight.

RKKA killed more Germans per month in 1941 as did the ~same-size French/British armies in May-June 1940. The average soldier actually fought pretty well that summer at the tactical level, especially when you consider their lack things like supplies, radios, and spare parts. Most surrendered only once surrounded, as did most non-Japanese soldiers in WW2.

Contrary to most narratives, RKKA declined qualitatively later as the initial cohort was replaced by less well-trained and probably lower-educated men drawn more extensively from the peasantry.

Likewise the evacuation and resurrection of industry is a feat that only a fairly strong state could have pulled off.

Stalinism sucked but it proved to be an effective mobilizer of resources.

was as late as 43 or 44, after it was clear the Germans were losing, an entire central Asian brigade attempted to defect across the lines (was detected and put down)

RKKA didn't use many Central Asian units in combat for exactly this reason. While their loyalty to the Soviet state was suspect, they were even less loyal when recruited into Wehrmacht units (and good on them).

If the Nazi's weren't genocidal and racisist assholes they probably could have won by saying "Freedom, Liberty, and Equality" as they marched through.

Probably true but removes the whole point from the German perspective.

And not necessary. Germany was just much more powerful and should have been able to win even when being asshats. By '42 Germany's empire produced nearly 4x as much steel as SU, for example. Even in '42, however, Ostheer was much weaker than it should have been due to the short war assumption that ruined German production in '40-'41 and the first half of '42. By the time production got going it was too late.

 

[ATP]

They put up a fight.

RKKA killed more Germans per month in 1941 as did the ~same-size French/British armies in May-June 1940. The average soldier actually fought pretty well that summer at the tactical level, especially when you consider their lack things like supplies, radios, and spare parts. Most surrendered only once surrounded, as did most non-Japanese soldiers in WW2.

Contrary to most narratives, RKKA declined qualitatively later as the initial cohort was replaced by less well-trained and probably lower-educated men drawn more extensively from the peasantry.

Likewise the evacuation and resurrection of industry is a feat that only a fairly strong state could have pulled off.

Stalinism sucked but it proved to be an effective mobilizer of resources.



RKKA didn't use many Central Asian units in combat for exactly this reason. While their loyalty to the Soviet state was suspect, they were even less loyal when recruited into Wehrmacht units (and good on them).



Probably true but removes the whole point from the German perspective.

And not necessary. Germany was just much more powerful and should have been able to win even when being asshats. By '42 Germany's empire produced nearly 4x as much steel as SU, for example. Even in '42, however, Ostheer was much weaker than it should have been due to the short war assumption that ruined German production in '40-'41 and the first half of '42. By the time production got going it was too late.

During first 3 weeks,soviets lost milion soldiers,11.000 tanks,and 400-500km for 22.000 KIA.Which mean,that their infrantry dyvisions made averagely 20km per day on their foot,crossing rivers.
Which mean,that they do not figh-becouse infrantry dyvision was making 30km per day on their own german territory,not crossing anything.

Another thing - Bodin group counterattack.They had 1200 tanks/114KW1/,6 infrantry motorized regiments,8 artillery regiments,calvary.
German one infrantry dyvision fought 200-300 light tanks supported by one artillery battery ,no infrantry,no guns.
No KW1 tanks,too.
German 19armored dyvisions fought later 24 soviet infrantry dyvisions which had 8 Kw tanks - which they found abadonned on road and used against germans.

On Ukraine soviets counter-attack had 4500 tanks - germans defenders registered maybe 1500.

If tanks crew vanished into thin air,that means,that most army just run.

 

[themarcksplan]

If tanks crew vanished into thin air,that means,that most army just run.

Which mean,that they do not fight

Who killed 22,000 Germans in the nine days of June fighting then? Zeus?

 

[ATP]

Who killed 22,000 Germans in the nine days of June fighting then? Zeus?

You take soviets sources about german losses seriously ? do not be silly.During Chałhun goł first day battle they reported schooting down 30 Ki27.Japaneese have 16,lost 5,not all to fighters.

Another example -
Ozylia island,germans planned to take soviet coastal battery /3-130/ on Kubassare penisula./14.9.41/ using gliders.Soviets repelled attack,travlers which was supposed to deliver reinformencerts retreated after few soviet shots.11 germans died,one He-59 floatpalne was destroyed.
Soviet commander W.Butitkin reported german tossing 550 bombs on tem/maybe 50 in reality/,destryed paratroopers/they do not existed//,destroyed gliders/all5,most soldiers widraw/,sunked 20 fishing boats ,4 ships/germans have none there/,one trawler,killed 4000 germans.From 300 involved both on sea and in gliders.

All other soviets reports was the same - problem is,if they were true,german army would die in 1941.

You want facts? germans do not lied about their losses/althought they do not count repaired tanks and planes as destroyed/,and ,at least front units,not lied about soviet losses and their strenght.

So,when when german dyvision faced Boldin Group and reported 200-300 light tanks without infrantry,that mean,that 900-1000 tanks including 114 KW1 vanished,just like 6 infrantry regiments and all artillery except one battery.

Do not blame them - they thought,that germans come liberate them from soviets.Everybody normal in their shoes would do the same - would you die for fucked thing like communism? no? they were normal people.

And started fighting,when german showed their true colours and started genociding left and right.

 

[Sol Zagato]

Who killed 22,000 Germans in the nine days of June fighting then? Zeus?

If they were uniformly organized and serious, it would have been multiple times higher. I venture this is mostly artillery, people cornered and not wanting to die, and the units that had their shit together.

 

[ATP]

If they were uniformly organized and serious, it would have been multiple times higher. I venture this is mostly artillery, people cornered and not wanting to die, and the units that had their shit together.

Besides,it was 3 weeks til 12.7.41.Germans died - but making 400-500km,and soviets lost million soldiers and 11.000 tanks at the same time,not mention 2 fortified lines.Either germans were superhumans for 3 weeks,and later ceased to be,or soviets do not fought as a army.

 

[themarcksplan]

germans do not lied about their losses

Which is why when the Germans say 22,000 Heer soldiers were killed in June 1941, you should believe them.

Unless you think horseflies killed all those Germans, it can't be denied that RKKA was putting up a fight.

If they were uniformly organized and serious, it would have been multiple times higher. I venture this is mostly artillery, people cornered and not wanting to die, and the units that had their shit together.

I don't know about multiple times higher. That would imply bloody casualty parity between Heer and RKKA, which almost never happened no matter how well-prepared were the Soviets and run-down was the Ostheer.

 

[Sol Zagato]

I don't know about multiple times higher. That would imply bloody casualty parity between Heer and RKKA, which almost never happened no matter how well-prepared were the Soviets and run-down was the Ostheer.

I mean higher Soviet combat casualties too. At the expense of the (enormous) number captured.

 

[themarcksplan]

I mean higher Soviet combat casualties too. At the expense of the (enormous) number captured.

Gotcha. This is probably true - more Soviets would have died in battle had so many not surrendered in large cauldrons. Those Soviets would have killed more Germans, though, if instead of being surrounded and cut off from supply they were fighting under normal conditions. Something around the ~5:1 bloody casualty ratios of 1943 would have prevailed.

What's interesting and under-remarked to me is this: Ostheer was losing about the same number of men per month in Summer 1941 as in Summer '43, despite the 1943 RKKA having ~2.5:1 numerical superiority and 1941 RKKA being roughly equal with Ostheer in numbers of men. That indicates that Soviet combat power, per man, declined between 1941 and 1943 - exactly the opposite of what most historians say. Declining Soviet qualitative performance makes perfect sense when one realizes that RKKA's Summer 1941 training standards were much higher than later in the war. We can see this effect already in 1941: Ostheer's daily losses in June-August were significantly higher than September-February despite no real let up in intensity. RKKA was already throwing poorly-trained men at Germany after the summer battles who were less effective than the prewar cohorts.

Soviet generalship improved and Stalin made fewer disastrous mistakes as the war went on, but this hides a qualitative decline in the Red Army at the tactical level.

This is another way in which we should be able to see Barbarossa as a devastating attack that almost worked. RKKA never truly recovered qualitatively and the SU never really recovered economically. It was a diminished country with a weakened army all the way into 1945; German failure to prepare for a longer war (and Allied help) was necessary to Soviet survival.

 

[sillygoose]

Gotcha. This is probably true - more Soviets would have died in battle had so many not surrendered in large cauldrons. Those Soviets would have killed more Germans, though, if instead of being surrounded and cut off from supply they were fighting under normal conditions. Something around the ~5:1 bloody casualty ratios of 1943 would have prevailed.

What's interesting and under-remarked to me is this: Ostheer was losing about the same number of men per month in Summer 1941 as in Summer '43, despite the 1943 RKKA having ~2.5:1 numerical superiority and 1941 RKKA being roughly equal with Ostheer in numbers of men. That indicates that Soviet combat power, per man, declined between 1941 and 1943 - exactly the opposite of what most historians say. Declining Soviet qualitative performance makes perfect sense when one realizes that RKKA's Summer 1941 training standards were much higher than later in the war. We can see this effect already in 1941: Ostheer's daily losses in June-August were significantly higher than September-February despite no real let up in intensity. RKKA was already throwing poorly-trained men at Germany after the summer battles who were less effective than the prewar cohorts.

Soviet generalship improved and Stalin made fewer disastrous mistakes as the war went on, but this hides a qualitative decline in the Red Army at the tactical level.

This is another way in which we should be able to see Barbarossa as a devastating attack that almost worked. RKKA never truly recovered qualitatively and the SU never really recovered economically. It was a diminished country with a weakened army all the way into 1945; German failure to prepare for a longer war (and Allied help) was necessary to Soviet survival.

I'd argue that the reason for the high losses in 1941 was more due to the fluidity of the fighting and the very high partisan/straggler effect. The more I can find from personal accounts of this period and the guerrilla war there was a huge amount of ambushes and general partisan warfare going on throughout 1941 as the pockets allowed for Soviet troops to flee into the woods and continue fighting. Sure there were a massive amount of surrenders, but there were also a lot of troops who continue to fight on and did quite well ambushing German rear area troops. The German army performed best when fighting stand up battles against an organized foe, but did quite a bit worse in the guerrilla war where number of actual partisans killed to anti-partisan troops lost was close to 1:1. So it would make sense that despite being outnumbered the Soviets did quite a bit worse when fighting stand up battles rather than when small elements of the Soviet army took advantage of the chaos of the advance of the enemy to wage a 'small war' in his rear area. That was after all something the Soviets and other Communist movements had prepared to do and Lenin in fact wrote a whole treatise about based on the 1905 experience and was later reinforced by Russian Civil War experience (and Spanish Civil War too).

There is a reason that Stalin made a speech on July 3rd 1941 encouraging the entire occupied zone and any standing by to be overrun to rise up against the invaders when and where possible and form partisan bands. As brutal as that war was it was surprisingly effective, even if the official Soviet numbers about losses inflicted are exaggerated.