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That's because its where the Buccaneer came from - it was designed primarily as a Sverdlov killer using a tactical nuke. It would come in very low, then loft the device on to the target. The radar problem would allow it to get in and out clear. The Banana was a very good aircraft that never got pushed the way it should have been.
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Absolutely right. If we had lots of money, keeping the A-10 around as an acquired and fully-depreciated asset would make some sense but with the current defense budget there are too many unfilled requirements to make it economically viable.
Considering that we've mostly been fighting ground forces using old Soviet-era tanks the A-10 was designed to kill or other ground forces which lack any anti-air capabilities, I think it'd be better to keep it around for the time being. If you plan on keeping close-air support as a mission, there really is no replacing the A-10. And from my experience in the Air Force, the main problem it has with the A-10 is that it doesn't fit its image of itself.
The first part of that is true. We have been fighting in a very permissive for almost twenty years. The times are changing though; that permissive environment is going away fast and we have to anticipate the environment we'll be facing in the future. Also, while that permissive environment has been rolling along, there's been two generational changes in the threat systems and those threat systems are becoming much more widely spread. Syria is a good example of that; there's kit flowing into there (and Turkey) that is two generations more advanced than anything we have seen in the past. At the same time the old stuff is fading away. Syria is the first war since WW2 (possible hyperbole there but I think its correct) in which there is no recorded case of anybody using a T-34-85 and even T-55s sightings have been rare. The operational standard is the T-72 and the first models of that are already fading away. In the Yemen War, the oldest AFVs seen are SU-100s (one of which knocked out a Saudi M-1. The problem with old kit is that every so often one runs into a shit-hot commander who can use it). At the same time, the newer shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles have a level of lethality that is a bit chilling and their homing heads can filter out decoys (flares). Its the micro-processing revolution at work. In Vietnam, the generational change in weaponry drove piston-engine counter-insurgency aircraft off the battlefield completely. The A-1 had been the perfect aircraft for Vietnam right up to the time the SA-7 arrived. Then, it was useless (See Air War - Vietnam) That's happened already with the A-10. Once it had its virtues but times have changed and the rate of change over time is speeding up.
Procurement processes and product development now take so long that the decisions we make now affect force structures in one to two decades time. Therefore strategic assessments have to think that far ahead and we have to make the investments now to get the equipment we need then. As Timothy points out, the best way of saving large sums of money is to take an entire type out of service. Cutting numbers but not types doesn't bring anything like the same level of economy. If we are going to take an entire type out, the A-10 is the obvious candidate followed by the B-1. In fact, last week the USAF proposed eliminating the B-1 fleet and investing the money in additional B-21s. Which is a very good idea given that most B-1s don't fly very much anyway. Don't get me wrong, I love the B-1, its one of my favorite aircraft, but the truth is that its a maintenance nightmare, has dreadful operability rates and is generally an expensive luxury. Getting rid of it simply makes economic sense and its cost-effectiveness that finally rules.
However, I strongly disagree with the comment that keeping the CAS mission means keeping the A-10. The A-10 is only one tool we have for that job. Today, CAS means using precision guided munitions, dropped or fired from above 15,000 feet. We have plenty of platforms that can do that. What we need to invest in is the tools to make that precision guided munitions capability more effective - which means more accurate and responsive. That means improving the air-to-ground interface so that the forward observers on the ground can get a faster and more accurate response. That's probably the top CAS priority right now. Right up there with it is battle management and working out whose troops are where. The A-10 is old and obsolete, designed for an environment that doesn't exist any more. Time for it to go so we can spend the money on up-to-date systems.
And the truth is that A-10's can and have operated in contested airspace and fulfilled their missions, and made it home after serious damage that would have killed any of the lesser platforms that you are cheerleading.
Not any more they don't. Now, they, like everybody else stay above 15,000 feet and deliver PGMs. Which, in fairness they do quite well BUT there are multiple other types that do it better. What matters today is connectivity; the ability of the aircraft to communicate with ground troops and provide timely-accurate support. That requires a generation of communications equipment the A-10s just don't have - the recent upgrades helped but they don't bring about a solution to that problem. By the way you should ask yourself how the seriously damaged A-10s got that way. As to "lesser platforms", the moment we have any serious opposition, A-10 becomes probably the least effective CAS platform we have right now. It doesn't offer anything that an A-28 can't provide cheaper and better.
In general, guns for ground attack are going away. They have/had their uses in very permissive environments but such environments shrink daily. The AC-130 is a good example. If you want big guns in aircraft, the AC-130 has a 105mm howitzer. Only the replacement for the AC-130 won't have a gun at all. Instead, it will be armed with palletized precision-guided bombs and missiles (Dragon Spear). The internal volume acquired by using a C-130 airframe allows for super-connectivity with the ground forces while disposing of the guns means the aircraft can stay above the 15,000 foot level. In fact, the Marines have already procured conversion kits for their C-130s that convert them into very much that configuration (Harvest Hawk) Palletized so the aircraft can do their normal thing most of the time and be turned into PGM launchers when needed. IIRC the Marines hold three sets of conversion kits per squadron of KC-130Js
I will note that one of the reasons the Air Force grits their teeth and keeps the A-10 in service is because the Army has stated point blank that if they retire them that the Army will throw the Key West Agreement out the window and take them for themselves.
That's not true; the Army has done nothing of the sort. It makes a good story but it is a myth along with the story that the Marines demanded to take the A-10 fleet over if the Air Force retired it. The Army has much more important things to worry about right now than a few obsolete ground-attack aircraft and they know very well that trying to take them over would destroy their budget. They're being hit by the same budget problems that everybody else is suffering. We've been putting off badly-needed investments for twenty years and its caught up with us big-time. The technical superiority we've taken for granted for decades has been seriously eroded. There's an old saying that nothing destroys armies faster than counter-insurgency operations and its true. The permissive environment we've had for two decades has meant that badly-needed replacement kit has been neglected and old, obsolete gear kept in service because it was marginally good enough and the funds for replacement were being consumed by O&M. Now, the old stuff like the A-10 has reached the end of its life and the replacements desperately need funding. That means we have to swallow and make some hard decisions. Things that are "nice to have" have to be dumped in favor of "things we must have".
