sillygoose
Well-known member
Steve, you're right we're going round and round in circles, so I guess at this point we should just drop it and move on to other topics.
A scenario occasionally raised is a different outcome for the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, sometimes what if Poland did better, or what if the Soviets marched to the Curzon line, but most often, and most dramatically, what if the Red Army conquered Warsaw and liquidated the second Polish Republic. This is usually followed by a discussion of where the border ends up- a restoration of the 1914 Russo-German border like the Reichswehr hoped, a continued Red Army advance and revolutionary wave into Europe, etc.
I'll pose a few questions and offer a few thoughts on some of the immediate and longer term consequences, including aspects that I don't think have gotten covered before, and put them out there for discussion:
1. Would conquering the Polish Republic and Polish Army open the door to Red revolution in Germany or Europe as a whole?
No. The last, best chance, for Red revolution, if it even was a chance, died with the Freikorps suppression of the Spartakist revolt. The broad coalition from militarists and Freikorps and civil servants and Social Democratic politicians and unionized workers were all against a Boleshevik path for Germany. If anything, Germany is likely to inherit back some territory from defeated Poland, de jure or de facto, to establish territorial contiguity with its now exposed, but very conservative, province of East Prussia.
2. If not sparking a German revolution, would the Red conquest of Poland at least lead to an early Soviet Communist conquest and sphere of influence over the Central European countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary) and Balkan countries south of Poland and Russia, like after WWII?
No. The Soviets completely defeating the Polish republic is not an easy outcome to achieve with just one single battle, the Red Army has its limitations.
If the Reds, with a little better planning and preparation, or the Poles with some worse, and the Reds have reasonable good fortune and the Poles have reasonable bad fortune, the Poles can lose, but the Red Army won't be in shape to go conquering additional countries.
About the only additional countries or "dominoes" that a Soviet conquest of Poland in 1920 makes it significantly easier for the Soviets to conquer or revolutionize are the three Baltic Republics, that's about it, in my view.
3. Would Poland become a Union Republic within the eventual Soviet Union, or formally separate, non-federated puppet Communist state, like after WWII?
My answer - Probably a separate, allied, puppet Communist state, like Outer Mongolia was.
Lenin may have had a preference for a transnational socialist federation, but Stalin, who was soon head of nationalities policy, strongly felt that national feeling was too strong among nationalities like Germans and Poles for their to be a shared sovereignty.
4. Will Communist takeover of Warsaw and Poland frighten and anger many people in Germany, France, Britain, Italy?
Yes. The Bolsheviks will appear stronger and more threatening.
5. Will European fear and anger about the takeover of Poland lead to an all Europe coalition to invade and liberate Poland and overthrow the Communist regime?
No. In OTL workers in the west often opposed and went on strike against sending aid to Poland. Nobody wanted another war, and trying to mobilize for one would fuel mass unrest. Sure there will be more hawks ‘saying’ or thinking this is necessary, but no government in the 1920s is going to do it.
6. Will the bigger, scarier Soviet-Polish bloc scare Germany and France into an earlier, reconciliation, EU, and collaborative defense against the common threat to the East?
Maaaaaayyyyybbbbeeee, but I really, really doubt it. Seems optimistic.
I actually think that in the short run Germany will be happy to destroy Poland and get some land back. In the long run as Soviet Russia and Poland get stronger, Germany will get less happy.
In the short run, France will be very disappointed to see Poland fall and be more frightened and angry at Bolesheviks and more reliant on the Little Entente powers and interested in cooperation with Italy and Britain.
France won’t want red revolution exported to Germany and may tolerate some build up of its defense in the east. But it won’t give up on reparations or the Rhineland occupation zones.
In the longer run, and this part I don’t think anybody discussed before, a Soviet aligned Communist interwar Poland will make it much *easier* not harder for France and the USSR to coordinate plans and actions to contain and counter a right wing revanchist Germany that rearms, compared with the interwar Polish situation of OTL
What about Finland? Otherwise agreed with your analysis here.
6. It's "Bolsheviks", not "Bolesheviks".
With the Polish question settled, Germany is likely to be considerably less revanchist in this scenario. German nationalists might still hope for an eventual Anschluss with Austria, but this could probably eventually be achieved through negotiation--or through force, if the Nazis still eventually come to power in Germany.
A non-Nazi Germany won't press the Sudetenland issue very heavily and other than that, the only territory that Germany could potentially be interested in would be the Memelland and, of course, Eupen-Malmedy, both of which are fairly minor. And Germany could already get the Memelland if the rest of Lithuania becomes Soviet along with Latvia and Estonia after the fall of Poland to Communism.
If Hitler and the Nazis still come to power in Germany in this scenario, I wonder if war over Czechoslovakia in 1938 (or whenever) would be more viable in this TL due to the Soviets sharing a common border with Czechoslovakia.
But if not (due to British fears of Communism spreading even further or whatever), then World War II might be completely avoided since after Czechoslovakia's fall, there won't be any Polish dispute, which will make it easier for the British, French, and Soviets to recreate the Triple Entente from World War I, which would likely make Hitler much more hesitant to go to war when he simultaneously had to fight on two fronts at once against Germany's entire World War I coalition (minus Italy).
I don't think there's anything objectively in the strategy geography of Poland and the Baltic states that makes Finland more militarily vulnerable.
Now subjectively, the Finns in the interwar might *feel* more vulnerable, might be more panicky and right wing, and have a harder time representing their democratic left, potentially weakening their cohesion as a functioning democracy and healthy polity, which could boomerang to doom them down the road. But that doesn't have to happen at all.
That's all you've got to criticize? I think I'm doing pretty good.
Agree in general, and on Anschluss specifically.
Some specifically on Anschluss:
- Anschluss agitation is not exclusively dependent on Nazis - Anschluss with Austria will likely become a goal of a democratic Germany also, because it would be a goal supported by major German Democratic Parties, notably the Social Democrats and Catholic Center Party. From the Austrian side, the Social Democrats reciprocate that interest and overall Anschluss probably has more support in Austria than Germany, if the cross-border ideological stars are aligned correctly. Pretty much only the Prussian Junker chauvinistic old-right has enough anti-Catholic prejudice to object to the addition of millions more Catholics. Maybe some north German Protestant and Jewish liberals too. As a matter of general public opinion, in the Weimar era, the Austrian public almost always supported Anschluss at even higher rates than the German.
- On Anschluss - it will arguably become technically "legal" in international law by 1939 or 1942 at the latest. Versailles in 1919 only had language forbidding unification of the Austrian republic with Germany for 20 years. Some loans Austria received in 1922 extended this a little to 1942, by conditioning them on not joining Germany until 1942. After 1942, or possibly soon after 1939, with the expiration of those agreements, unless local party politicians get in the way, Germany and Austria are very likely to form a customs union, then a federation and political union under democratic conditions, even without Hitler and Nazis pushing things.
- Once Austro-German union is in effect, it will automatically raise the salience of the Sudeten German issue in greater Germany and Czechoslovakia. Democratic Germany won't turn it into a casus belli or brink or war issue, but it can be a prolonged irritant. Creative diplomats on the German and Czechoslovak side may try to resolve differences and manage tensions less by promoting separatism than by promoting economic and security cooperation and alliances directly at the Prague to Berlin level. A democratic, economically successful Germany, might have a chance to woo Czechoslovakia, but a Nazi one would be repellent to Prague.
Yes indeed, and even if Lithuania is independent, Memel is small enough beer that a land grab of Memel alone isn't likely to start a continent-wide war.
Abso-freakin'-lutely. First of all, for Czechoslovakia to be pressured not to fight and make concessions, it would not take only two countries (Britain and France) to convince the Czechs, but four countries, Communist Poland plus the USSR in addition to Britain and France to convince the Czechs not to fight.
The Soviets and Czechs can count on Communist Poland to grant Soviet forces free passage across its land or airspace to move forward to defend Czechoslovakia and attack Germany anywhere along the length of its long eastern frontier. That applies even if Britain and France stand aloof.
To the extent Stalin lets the Communist Poles advocate an opinion, they will favor standing with Czechoslovakia as a forward defense of their own southern flank, and would in some ways see a war with Germany as a way to get back ethnic Polish territory.
All things being equal, one would think Stalin would prefer any fighting to start as far west as possible, with the Czechs and Poles doing a disproportionate amount of the dying, even if he is a little concerned about his own force readiness.
But even if the Soviets advise the Czechs to back down, they may be more inclined to try their luck, figuring that once things get hot and shooting starts, one of the four allies, probably Communist Poland, the USSR, or France, will start helping them out if they start to lose, or will lend them their territory to retreat, regroup and counterattack, unwilling to tolerate a Nazi build-up next door.
It is good you said "a war over Czechoslovakia in 1938 (or whenever)", because although chances aren't great, in order to get more time to prepare, reduce chances of war, and prove the Socialist countries did everything for peace, the USSR and Poland may go along with the British and French in advising the Czechs to concede the Sudetenland.
But even then, since Poland and USSR will have territorial contiguity, they won't have to accept a German occupation of Prague as a fait accompli, they can rush in forces to oppose it, send in their own forces to preempt it, or throw in their Air Force against the Germans as soon as they move.
Agreed, this is an underrated consequence of Poland falling under Soviet hegemony early. I am indeed positing that if Poland is in the Soviet sphere during the interwar, but that a Hitler figure still takes power, any of his various acts to go for full rearmament, establish the Wehrmacht, militarize the Rhineland, or annex Austria may then and there stimulate an effective Entente between France, the USSR, and Poland, likely extending to other territories of mutual interest like the Low Countries and Czechoslovakia.
If the Germans move onto Prague, then I would think that the Poles and Soviets would still want assurances that at least the French would be willing to act if they act. Ideally the British as well. They might not want to fight a long war with Nazi Germany over Prague by themselves, without any Western help whatsoever. They might be brutal totalitarian Communists, but they're not that stupid. They don't want to risk losing everything to Hitler!
Agreed and also you should probably include Britain in this Entente as well.
Of course they will *want* western pledges! And action! They *might* even wait for them before lifting a finger, not wanting to be stuck alone.
But they also may not want to wait inactive while Hitler gobbles up territory.
First of all, this alternative USSR has a history of winning its Polish war, so it may be more militarily confident, and that feeling of confidence may carry on forward through the 1930s, making the Soviets feel like if worst comes to worst, they can handle the Germans for a good while until the westerners feel like looting them.
Second, they could do a flexible talk/fight strategy, sending troops forward, engaging in combat, but holding secret talks with the Nazis about a new territorial dividing line in Czechoslovakia to go into effect if the west doesn't get in in a certain # of days. They can certainly strategically leak that things like that might be happening to try to spur western action.
Third, they could act in ways to spur Czech resistance and slow the Nazis down without irrevocably committing to war or cutting all diplomatic channels. Doing so by, encouraging the Czechs, even if only by unofficial, deniable means. Saying whatever Polish or Soviet forces are involved in Czechoslovakia are just self-organized "volunteers" like in Spain (or the OTL later Chinese in Korea), or by having Communist Poland, but not the USSR openly intervene in the Czech war, using the Poles as the meat shield for the Soviet Union but being able to cut losses short of the official USSR border if necessary.
That would be ideal, but I imagine the British would be the most stand-offish and last ones to join in after trying all other alternatives.
@raharris1973 I don't want to create a separate thread for this, so I'll just post it here:
What if the Bolsheviks advanced up to the Curzon Line in the Polish-Soviet War, but no further? For instance, if the Bolshevik forces that are meant to capture Warsaw are sent to the Lwow area to help with the capture of that city instead, after which the Bolsheviks decide to embrace a Curzon Line western border in order to avoid appearing as a completely rogue state in Western eyes.
In such a scenario, with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia actually having a common border, would Britain and France actually be willing to fight for Czechoslovakia in 1938?
And if not, would Poland have been more receptive to Hitler's offers of alliance the following year (1939) due to a lot of Poles still being left out of Poland, specifically in the Kresy?
I'm sure that in such a scenario, the Poles would be absolutely enraged at all of the Polish victims of Stalin's purges, whose numbers are likely to be much higher in this TL due to the Soviet control over the Kresy.
OK - and I think this is actually somewhat more likely to happen and be a stable result than the alternative in the OP of the Soviets seizing Warsaw and all of Central/Congress Poland, Posen, Galicia.
Maybe, and maybe not, but the Czechs would be willing to fight, and the Soviets would probably at least engage with aid and Soviet and international "volunteers", fighting to the last Czechoslovakian, and last inch of Czechoslovakia.
I tend to be a skeptic of this idea, even though it is somewhat popular. I don't believe the Poles would be willing to accept Hitler's likely price, territorial concessions over Danzig and the corridor, and military rights of way through Poland. Poland I could imagine accepting an "alliance"/non-aggression pact with the Nazis and an anti-Soviet stance, if it involved no territorial sacrifices on its part and no foreign troops on its soil.
If they are there, they will be purged in large numbers, but I wonder if the end of the war will be accompanied by mass migrations, forced or voluntary, during the 1920s, that will drastically reduce the Polish (or Polish Catholic) population of the USSR. Stalin was already commissar of nationalities, not sure if he was obsessed with keeping ethnicities in tidy boxes yet, and international movement restrictions on Soviet citizens weren't as strict in the 20s as they later became with the introduction of the 5 year plans.
Politically that was not viable. The Poles were squeezing Danzig economically, the German people demanded it returned, and most of the power brokers in the country wanted it dealt with, especially if Hitler was going to make a final deal on the border. Technically Hitler not making an issue of the rest of the Corridor other than having an extraterritorial RR and highway to East Prussia WAS making major concessions to Poland, as by rights they could have demanded revisions under the Lacarno Treaty and due to the ethnic makeup of West Prussia.FWIW, if Hitler was smart, he could keep the status quo situation in Danzig indefinitely. After all, the status quo for Germans in Danzig was much more tolerable than the status quo for Germans in South Tyrol, and yet Hitler was willing to sell the latter group out to Mussolini. If Hitler will want Poland as an ally that badly, then he could tell the Danzig Germans to suck it up and permanently accept the status quo or, alternatively, go and move to Germany if they want to live under German rule so badly. The extraterritorial road through the Corridor was not an unreasonable German demand, though.
Politically that was not viable. The Poles were squeezing Danzig economically, the German people demanded it returned, and most of the power brokers in the country wanted it dealt with, especially if Hitler was going to make a final deal on the border. Technically Hitler not making an issue of the rest of the Corridor other than having an extraterritorial RR and highway to East Prussia WAS making major concessions to Poland, as by rights they could have demanded revisions under the Lacarno Treaty and due to the ethnic makeup of West Prussia.
As Henderson, the British ambassador to Germany, told Chamberlain Hitler was the most moderate German on the Danzig issue.
No point in opening the door to revisions if you're just going to deny them all. The entire point of the treaty though was to revise the ToV and it apparently pissed off Poland quite a bit when it was signed, since they realized it would mean that the border was open to revision.Technically speaking, the Locarno Treaty merely allowed Germany to make territorial claims in the East. It didn't actually mean that the Western Powers would actually recognize these territorial claims. And the ethnic makeup of the Polish Corridor was actually Polish-majority; it was Danzig that was German-majority.
FWIW, though, I do think that Germany's claim to Danzig was a fair one, as evidenced by the post-World War II mass expulsion of the Danzig Germans to Germany. So, Germany ultimately ended up getting the Danzig Germans, just not Danzig itself!
Here's a linguistic map of West Prussia in 1910:
Kashubians were historically counted as Poles.
Here's the map:No point in opening the door to revisions if you're just going to deny them all. The entire point of the treaty though was to revise the ToV and it apparently pissed off Poland quite a bit when it was signed, since they realized it would mean that the border was open to revision.
Sure the majority of the West Prussia was linguistically Polish or Polish related, but that doesn't mean everyone there would vote with Poland in a plebiscite as Poland found out in Upper Silesia. That said there were German majority parts that could have been claimed if a plebiscite was held; as to Danzig since it was nearly all German it not being part of Germany really made no sense, especially since the public in that city wanted to rejoin their country.
By Poles. The Kashubians didn't necessarily think of themselves as Polish and did more often than not vote to stay with Germany as I recall.
BTW your map doesn't show up.
I'll reply more when I have time, but IOTL it was actually Poland who first raised the Danzig issue in September just days before the Munich Conference. When Ribbentrop brought it up in October with a formal offer Beck apparently actually actively studied the proposal until he was ordered to abandon the study by the government and was ordered to deny any further requests. So I'm not sure if it was a discussion started on Beck's own initiative and when it became a serious consideration his bosses cut it off or if something came up after Munich that caused Poland to think they wouldn't have to deal after all.
Silesia and the eastern lands lost to Germany would be retaken during the chaos by different Freikorps.
USA and UK would probably release Germany from the ToV. Both countries send expeditionary forces to Russia in 1919.
I doubt the Red Army has the strength to march onto the Germany. The German communists had been crushed already, their personnel either executed or scattered.
Though the Reichswehr was not large or powerful, there were dozens of Freikorps across Germany. An invasion of Germany would see them rising to challenge and carving their way through the communist hordes with MP 18 and trench mace in hand.