Vice President George Dallas, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Walker, and Secretary of State James Buchanan were all in favor of All Mexico. More importantly, perhaps, is that a large and growing faction in the Senate, increasingly dominant in the Northern states and having split the South, was also in favor of annexing Mexico:
The Slavery Question and the Movement to Acquire Mexico, 1846-1848 by John D. P. Fuller, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jun., 1934), pp. 31-48:
In the Congress which assembled in December, 1847, the question of the acquisition of all Mexico appeared in the open for the first time. Among those who may definitely be numbered with the expansionists were Senators Dickinson and Dix of New York, Hannegan of Indiana, Cass of Michigan, Allen of Ohio, Breese and Douglas, of Illinois, Atchison of Missouri, Foote and Davis of Mississippi, and Houston and Rusk of Texas. The leadership in the fight, against imperialism fell not to the anti-slavery element but to pro-slavery Democrats. On December 15, Calhoun in the Senate and Holmes in the House introduced resolutions opposing the acquisition of Mexico. Other pro-slavery Democrats, Butler of South Carolina, and Meade and Hunter of Virginia, also registered their opposition.
Further:
In the Congress which assembled in December, 1847, the question of the acquisition of all Mexico appeared in the open for the first time. Among those who may definitely be numbered with the expansionists were Senators Dickinson and Dix of New York, Hannegan of Indiana, Cass of Michigan, Allen of Ohio, Breese and Douglas, of Illinois, Atchison of Missouri, Foote and Davis of Mississippi, and Houston and Rusk of Texas. The leadership in the fight, against imperialism fell not to the anti-slavery element but to pro-slavery Democrats. On December 15, Calhoun in the Senate and Holmes in the House introduced resolutions opposing the acquisition of Mexico. Other pro-slavery Democrats, Butler of South Carolina, and Meade and Hunter of Virginia, also registered their opposition.
Between October, 1847, and the following February the theme of the story underwent considerable alteration. By the latter date, as noted above, the National Era was advocating the absorption of Mexico, insisting that it would be free territory, and citing along with other evidence, Calhoun's opposition to annexation as proof that the anti-slavery interests had nothing to fear from extensive territorial acquisitions. In other words, the National Era was convinced that if there had been a "pro-slavery conspiracy" to acquire all Mexico, it could not realize its ends even though the whole country were annexed. This conviction seems to have come largely as a result of the propaganda, which was streaming from the northern expansionist press and the opposition of Calhoun.The editor probably reasoned that since Calhoun was opposing absorption the expansionists at the North must be correct. If the main body of the anti-slavery forces could be converted to this point of view, the movement for absorption which was growing rapidly at the time would doubtless become very strong indeed.
Care should be taken not to exaggerate the anti-slavery sentiment for all Mexico. It is evident that some such sentiment did exist, but there was not sufficient time for it to develop to significant proportions. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo had already been signed in Mexico when the National Era took up the cry of all Mexico with or without the Wilmot Proviso. In a short while the war was over and whatever anti-slavery sentiment there was for all Mexico collapsed along with the general expansion movement. Had the war continued several months longer it is not improbable that increasing numbers from the anti-slavery camp would have joined forces with those who were demanding the acquisition of Mexico. Their action would have been based on the assumption that they were undermining the position of the pro slavery forces. It was, not to be expected that those abolitionists, and there were undoubtedly some, who were using the bogey of "extension of slavery" to cover up other reasons for opposition to annexation, would have ever become convinced of the error of their ways. They would hold on to their pet theory to the bitter end.
To summarize briefly what seem to be the conclusions to be drawn from this study, it might be said that the chief support for the absorption of Mexico came from the North and West and from those whose pro-slavery or anti-slavery bias was not a prime consideration. In quarters where the attitude toward slavery was all-important there was, contrary to the accepted view, a "pro-slavery conspiracy" to prevent the acquisition of all Mexico and the beginnings of an "anti-slavery conspiracy" to secure all the territory in the Southwest that happened to be available. Behind both these movements was a belief that expansion would prove injurious to the slavery interest. Had the war continued much longer the two movements, would probably have developed strength and have become more easily discernible. Lack of time for expansionist sentiment to develop was the chief cause of this country's, failure to annex Mexico in 1848. Even as it was, however, there might have been sufficient demand for annexation in February and March, 1848, to have wrecked the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo had it not been for the opposition of pro-slavery Democrats led by Calhoun. Their attitude divided the party committed to expansion in the presence of a unified opposition. Whatever the motives which may be attributed to Calhoun and his friends, the fact remains that those who feel that the absorption of Mexico in 1848 would have meant permanent injury to the best interests of the United States, should be extremely grateful to those slaveholders. To them not a little credit is due for the fact that Mexico is to-day an independent nation.
I'd also include The United States and Mexico, 1847-1848 by Edward G. Bourne in the The American Historical Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Apr., 1900), pp. 491-502 as he largely came to the same conclusions as this aforementioned work did.
[34] However, two years later, after the treaty of peace was signed at Guadaloupe on Feb. 2, 1848, and sixteen days later, after he was superceded in the command of the army by Butler, he could write, "Two fifths of the Mexican population, including more than half of the Congress, were desirous of annexation to the US, and, as a stepping stone, wished to make me president ad interim.'"
The United States Army in Mexico City, by Edward S. Wallace (Military Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Autumn, 1949), pp. 158-166) also states a desire for annexation among the well off of Mexico City, and goes into detail about the relationships cultivated between American soldiers and Mexican civilians.
So, the PoD is Nicholas Trist being among the many Americans to die to Yellow Fever in late 1847 in Mexico. By the time a replacement is sent, the Pro-Annexationist crowd is in the majority and the we end up with Mexico in it's entirety being absorbed by the United States sometime in 1848. No insurgency pans out, as most Mexicans prove indifferent or even in favor of this change in political circumstances.
For one, I think this would remove the Civil War I think, because there is no need for the Compromise of 1850 or Kansas-Nebraska Act, given the Missouri Compromise line can be maintained.
While Mexico was anti slavery, it was anti slavery on paper. Latin American nations are extraordinarily hardcore about class and caste.
"Los que nacen de abajo tienen que quedarse abajo, hay que saber su lugar por su puesto" - An Argentine progressive of the 1900s when asked if she was in favor of the mixing of society.
I wouldn't be surprised if the Mexicans business class and the criollos support and fund and encourage secession as a sword of damocles to force the Whigs and later Republicans to keep the abolitionists out of power because of a belief that Abos would try and force apart the barriers between the roles using black men to do it.
I don't know if the ACW would actually happen bu the US.might look very different because of this.
For one, I think this would remove the Civil War I think, because there is no need for the Compromise of 1850 or Kansas-Nebraska Act, given the Missouri Compromise line can be maintained.
The fact that slavery has been abolished in Mexico since c.1820 does not matter?
I'd sooner expect the USA to be swamped by Free States in the Furthest South than to acquire new Slave States. Something the Democrats knew very well. So you'd get some sort of compromise , a Corwin Ammendment or ACW by the early/mid 1850s.
On a different tangent - I'd expect the annexed territories to be largely americanised down to the Tropic of Cancer (the former Provincias Internas) inside a few decades due to immigration. The old Virreynato de Mexico is a different matter ...
While Mexico was anti slavery, it was anti slavery on paper. Latin American nations are extraordinarily hardcore about class and caste.
"Los que nacen de abajo tienen que quedarse abajo, hay que saber su lugar por su puesto" - An Argentine progressive of the 1900s when asked if she was in favor of the mixing of society.
I wouldn't be surprised if the Mexicans business class and the criollos support and fund and encourage secession as a sword of damocles to force the Whigs and later Republicans to keep the abolitionists out of power because of a belief that Abos would try and force apart the barriers between the roles using black men to do it.
I don't know if the ACW would actually happen bu the US.might look very different because of this.
In agreement, I think you misunderstood what I was saying. Basically everything South of the Missouri Compromise Line would be Slave State or nominally so.
The fact that slavery has been abolished in Mexico since c.1820 does not matter?
I'd sooner expect the USA to be swamped by Free States in the Furthest South than to acquire new Slave States. Something the Democrats knew very well. So you'd get some sort of compromise , a Corwin Ammendment or ACW by the early/mid 1850s.
On a different tangent - I'd expect the annexed territories to be largely americanised down to the Tropic of Cancer (the former Provincias Internas) inside a few decades due to immigration. The old Virreynato de Mexico is a different matter ...
To quote from Cotton Regions of Mexico by Samuel Dicken, Economic Geography, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Oct., 1938), pp. 363-371:
Cotton is the most important commercial crop in Mexico, second in value after corn. Six districts in the northern border states, Mexicali, Jua'rez, Conchos, Matamoras, Don Martin and Laguna (Figure 1), account for 90 per cent of the production; the remainder is widely scattered through a dozen states.
We have an example of a populated area switching to American rule. New Mexico had a population about as large as Coahuila's and a little more than half of Nuevo León or Chiahuahua. It provides a perfectly valid template for how those territories would have developed under American rule; with one wrinkle that I'll get to later.
We also know what American troops experienced during the occupation. Mexican politicians in the D.F. were horrified at the level of indifference, shading over in many cases -- not least Nuevo León -- outright collaboration.
The wrinkle, which would make Coahuila and Nuevo León different from New Mexico, is that the elites in the northeastern states actively desired American annexation and the extension of slavery. We know this because they asked for it! Santiago Vidaurri wrote a letter to Richmond in 1861 volunteering Coahuila and Nuevo León to the Confederate cause. (Vidaurri annexed Coahuila to N.L. and installed himself as the governor of Tamaulipas.)
These sympathies predated the Civil War. In fact, Vidaurri had been perfectly happy in 1855 to return escaped slaves to Texas. The agreement failed because the Texans wanted to send in their own people to recapture the escapees, not principled opposition; ironically, he made a whole bunch of antislavery proclamations in 1857, only to reverse them and start sending slaves home in 1858. It is hard to believe that Vidaurri or the elites that supported him would have opposed slavery, given their opportunism and their incessant complaints about labor shortages.
More poignantly, Martin Robinson Delany, the biggest proponent of free black emigration to Mexico encouraged them to settle far away from the border; Mexicans in the north were not to be trusted. Moreover, the illegal status of the refugees meant that they were denied the most basic rights and often abused. (Rosalie Schwartz is the best source; I'd also look at Sarah Cornell if you're interested.)
There is a huge amount of fallow land at this time and no organized peasantry -- that's why there were labor shortages with migrants from the south brought up on indentures. So land grabs are not a problem. Moreover, the locals will control the state governments; the techniques that Anglos used in South Texas won't be applicable. Land grabs by slaveowning Anglos aren't the issue, although there will be some anger from smallholders. This could get particularly nasty in Chihuahua; thus our earlier speculation that Chihuahua would have strong Union sympathies. (Not unlike New Mexico.)
1 - Most, if not all, of those six districts are arid and must use irrigation to grow cotton. How does this change things?
2 - In mt post I wrote that I expect Coahila and similar to go the way of New Mexico or Arizona.
3 - one dude writing a letter - even if he is a local big shot - might not be the most accurate expression of local sentiment. Nevertheless some interesting facts there, that the northern caudillos were not abolitionists (same as e.g. Lincoln) - thanks for the quotes!
1 - Most, if not all, of those six districts are arid and must use irrigation to grow cotton. How does this change things?
2 - In mt post I wrote that I expect Coahila and similar to go the way of New Mexico or Arizona.
3 - one dude writing a letter - even if he is a local big shot - might not be the most accurate expression of local sentiment. Nevertheless some interesting facts there, that the northern caudillos were not abolitionists (same as e.g. Lincoln) - thanks for the quotes!
I remember a poster on another board suggesting this and actually giving a link. When I actually read the link I found out that what happened was that during the 1860's a number of locals in that region made a lot of money trading cotton to bypass the Union blockade. I.e. they bought cotton from Texas, getting good prices as they were the only effective market, exported it from Mexican ports to bypass the Union blockade and in turn imported items to sell onto Texas, again at top dollar.
A couple of decades later, possibly aided by those funds and experience, a local cotton industry started up using a different type of cotton in the region. It relied on migrant periodic workers because they were largely needed for only short periods so were shuttled in and out again in busy times. As such this was easier for the local landlords than using slaves would be as they would either have the slaves largely idle or having to arrange to move them to other work.
Steve
PS Had a look to find that link but couldn't identify it on a quick run through and kept getting side tracked by threads I had forgotten about and reading some of them again! One of the problems of being an AH addict.
LOL!
A few years ago Lithuania and Moldavia saw their exports of apples to Russia jump up several hundred percent on a year-to-year basis. How? Russia embargoed Polish apples ...
I remember a poster on another board suggesting this and actually giving a link. When I actually read the link I found out that what happened was that during the 1860's a number of locals in that region made a lot of money trading cotton to bypass the Union blockade. I.e. they bought cotton from Texas, getting good prices as they were the only effective market, exported it from Mexican ports to bypass the Union blockade and in turn imported items to sell onto Texas, again at top dollar.
A couple of decades later, possibly aided by those funds and experience, a local cotton industry started up using a different type of cotton in the region. It relied on migrant periodic workers because they were largely needed for only short periods so were shuttled in and out again in busy times. As such this was easier for the local landlords than using slaves would be as they would either have the slaves largely idle or having to arrange to move them to other work.
Steve
PS Had a look to find that link but couldn't identify it on a quick run through and kept getting side tracked by threads I had forgotten about and reading some of them again! One of the problems of being an AH addict.
Re-exporting from Texas in the 1860s doesn't count towards local production. As it were, the local cotton industry actually pre-dated the American Civil War by several decades:
Seasonal usage of slave labor was also not an issue; the winter months were often very lax times on American plantations anyway but seasonal labor workings were also not uncommon in general.
To be fair, by the 1840s domestic production in Mexico was unable to keep up with the demands of the textile industry. Domestic production did start to take off in the 1850s and 1860s though, although here would occur even faster; if experience and funding are what you need, Americans settling from the South to cotton farm would have such in abundance.
Did some more research on this to learn more the proposed Southern Trans-Continental Railway, which I thought I would share. The citation is Official explorations for Pacific railroads, 1853‑1855 by G. L. Albright (University of California Publications in History, XI, Berkeley, 1921):
Delegates from twelve southern states and several northern and western states met at Memphis in October, 1849, to discuss the question of a transcontinental railroad and to urge upon Congress the necessity of immediate action.46 Lieutenant Maury, superintendent of the National Observatory at Washington, and a man well informed upon the western and Pacific regions, was elected president. Resolutions were drawn up stating: first, that it was the duty of the general government to provide at an early period for the construction of a national railroad from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean; second, that engineers should be appointed and surveys and the location of the route be completed by the general government; third, that for the construction of the road the public lands constituted a proper fund, and that it was the duty of Congress, after the building of the main trunk road, to aid by an appropriation from the national domain in the construction of branch railroads to connect with the Great Lakes and the great thoroughfares leading to the Atlantic, and also to aid in the construction of branches from the main trunk to suitable points on the Gulf of Mexico; and fourth, that in the event of the appropriation by Congress of a considerable portion of the public lands, or of the proceeds of the sales thereof, to the construction of a railroad, liberal appropriations of the public lands lying within the limits of the respective states should be made to aid in the construction.47
The proposed route, as advocated by the Memphis Convention, would commence at the port of San Diego, pursuing a direct line to the Colorado River; thence to the Gila and along the valley of the latter to El Paso del Norte; thence across the state of Texas to its northeastern boundary near the thirty-fourth parallel of north latitude, and terminating at some point on the Mississippi River between the mouth of the Ohio and the mouth of the Red, preferably at Memphis.48 The memorial of the Memphis Convention was referred to the House Committee on Naval Affairs, which reported August 1, 1850. The report of its chairman, Mr. Stanton, embodied the entire memorial and was accompanied by a bill providing for the survey of the proposed routes for a railroad across the continent.49
The St. Louis Convention, with similar objects in view, met in the same month and was attended by delegates from both northern and southern states. The guiding spirit of the meeting was Senator Benton, and it was due primarily to his influence that the following resolutions were passed: (1) "That, in the opinion of this convention, it is the duty of the General Government to provide, at an early period, for the construction of a central national railroad from the valley of the Mississippi to the Pacific ocean"; and (2) "That, in the opinion of this convention a grand trunk railroad, with branches to St. Louis, Memphis and Chicago, would be such a central and national one."50 To avoid state and local prejudices the Convention proposed that the government should confine its operations to the territory beyond the limits of the states, leaving the various branches to be built by the states through liberal grants of government lands. The Convention also urged the necessity of a thorough survey of all routes that might be considered practicable.
Finally, the plan of Robert Mills sought to mollify both sides with a compromise:
Mills' Central Route to the Pacific.—A route similar to that recommended by the Memphis Convention was in May, 1852, urged upon Congress by the memorial of Robert Mills.53 Mills had given the subject serious consideration for years, and had long sought to arouse and fix public attention upon it with a view to a practicable result. As early as 1847, he had mapped out a definite route and asked for a survey by the government.54 In his memorial he emphasized the necessity of immediate action, believing that sufficient information had been gathered from previous explorations to map out a practicable route. He proposed two main eastern branches, the terminus of one being at St. Louis, which would connect with all roads coming from the north, east, southeast, and as far south as Richmond, and that of the other at Memphis, which would connect with all southern railroads. After uniting near Van Buren on the Arkansas River, the main trunk would follow a direct line to El Paso del Norte, and thence by way of the Gila Valley to San Diego. Mills believed that the Gila route would prove more advantageous, even to San Francisco, than one by the Great Basin and Sacramento Valley, eight degrees further north. He proposed that the work be national in construction and ownership and urged that surveys be made so as to judge of the route "that would centralize advantages and give to each state an equal chance through branch connections."
So, I am honestly thinking about a timeline based on this so I thought I'd share some of my ideas/expand upon ones I've already shared.
Politics and Economics of the United States -
The Compromise of 1850 did not last IOTL because it left the question of Western Territories unresolved, instead relying on the concept of Popular Sovereignty. This ultimately led the South as a bloc to pick a fight via pushing for the Kansas-Nebraska Act, an event which precipitated the collapse of the non-section Whig Party and its replacement with the aggressively Free Soil (with a strong Abolitionist faction to boot as well) Republican Party. Sectional tensions from there on only increased, ultimately leading to the Civil War. To quote from The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party by Michael Holt, on pages 981-982:
"The death of the Whig Party thus had consequences, and none graver than the outbreak of the Civil War in April 1861. This is not to say that there never could have been a civil war had a bisectional Whig Party survived. If anything, this study should show how rapidly contingent events could change things. But surely the circumstances provoking that war and its chronology would be different. The historical Civil War, the one that started in April 1861, resulted primarily from the fact that an exclusively northern and overtly Anti-Southern Republican party, not a bisectional Whig party, benefited most from anger at the Democrats in 1856 and defeated Democrats for the presidency in 1860. That Southern fire-eaters who had unsuccessfully sought secession for decades could have exploited the election of a Whig president, supported by southern Whigs, to trigger disunion seems doubtful."
Further on, in pages 982-983, Holt further states that:
"...no Whig action did more to destroy the party and bring on the war than southern Whigs' easily avoidable support for the Nebraska Act in 1854, a mistake that many of them later rued."
Here, though, this has all been avoided because there is no need for Popular Sovereignty when all of former Mexico can be inducted into the Union on a Pro-Slavery basis, whether real or nominal. There's no need to fight over the status of Kansas or Nebraska in order to maintain a 1:1 balance in the Senate or the like when both sections can, via the extension of the Missouri Compromise Line to the Pacific, carve 10-15 states each out of their respective settlement/expansion regions in the West. The South had already long since conceded the North was going to dominate the House, their reliance was on the Senate to safeguard their regional interests and the fact that both parties would be Trans-Sectional would be a further consolation to dissuade Dis-Union. As for Northern interests, the elimination of the prospect of Slavery encroaching upon them before it can even be born as a perceived as a possible threat. Long term, I'd imagine Slavery gradually dies out between 1890-1910 due to a mixture of international pressure and changing economic structures, as it becomes more profitable factoring in everything to just switch to free labor.
So, with the Civil War avoided, the U.S. can focus from the early 1850s onward on Western settlement as well as the development of the economy. Did the Civil War Retard Industrialization? by Thomas C. Cochran makes this point beautifully, by providing a lot of statistics and figures which put the economic impact of the war into focus. Case in point is value added by manufacture, with Cochran citing the following in terms of increases:
That the 1860s decade was the lowest in the data set immediately stands out, which is continually reinforced by looking at other metrics. Although he does cite an exact number, total commodity output from 1839 to 1899 saw an elevenfold increase, averaging slightly below 50% a decade but the with the 1860s decade again, the lowest. For more clarity, pig iron-one of the main 19th Century commodities-shows this well:
Although yearly data is not available for earlier than 1850, the 1840-1850 rate of growth was 97% and the 1870-1880 was 130%. Again, we see the 1860s standing out for its low growth rates. Finally, we look at railroads, where Cochran shows that 1851 to 1855 saw 11,627 miles of trackage laid, slowing to 8,721 miles for 1856-1860, to finally just 4,076 miles during 1861 to 1865-despite the 1862 Act authorizing the Trans-Continental Railway! After the war, the rate jumps back up to 16,174 miles of railway construction for 1866-1870. Putting it into percentages, the rate of 1840-1860 was around 70% and for 1870-1890 it was 75%; for 1860-1870 it was just 15%.
Given all of this, I think it's fair to say that without the Civil War (and perhaps the boost of Mexico being in the U.S.) that the U.S. will become the world's largest economy by GDP (PPP) in the 1860s instead of the 1870s as historical, displacing the UK in most economic categories by the 1870s instead of 1880s as historical and finally will close out the 19th Century as unquestionably the largest economy in essentially all respects. In particular, the railroad building-especially the proposed Southern route with its Charleston to Vicksburg line-could have emerge impacts; it's likely Birmingham, Alabama will be developed sooner, while West Virginia could be economically tied into the rest of Virginia to jump-start the industrialization of Virginia and Richmond by enabling easy access to the resources of the area.
This, combined with the annexation of Mexico as a whole will definitely have impacts in foreign affairs, but I'll get to that later.
For now though, I'd like to address one final domestic point for the United States, and that is of the Abolitionists and their political/social culture. Historically, after their success in the Civil War in ending the institution of Slavery, the political drive of Abolitionists and others in their vein turned to other social causes. Many went on to lay the foundations of the Prohibition movement, to support educational causes, or the like; there was overlap between the American Missionary movement of the late 19th Century and Women's Suffrage was well. Here, though, I can't help but wonder what the end result of the Slavery question being settled in the 1850s would entail for them. Most, I'd imagine, would still go onto other causes once it becomes clear the political headwinds just aren't in their favor to continue to press on this issue, in both the North and the South. Many, however, might be so disgusted as to leave the United States and thus we would have an enlarged missionary movement in the closing decades of the century. That can have a lot of impacts, which leads into my next section.
China -
I assume most of the readers are familiar with the Taiping Rebellion, the bloodiest war of the 19th Century and one of the bloodiest in the history of warfare as a whole. From 1850 to 1864, the conflict consumed millions of lives and threatened to drive the Qing over the edge and become a general Han revolt, with only the heterodox nature of the Taiping system probably preventing this, given their extreme opinions and actions on a variety of topics that offended the sensibilities of much of the Chinese population; it should be noted that Hong Rengnan did try to alleviate this with sweeping reforms, but they came too late to turn the tide. Regardless, it should be noted that the Taiping were not the only rebels at this time, and the issues for the Qing were widespread in this regard, as they began to enter what became their terminal decline:
Given all this, I'm content to say some sort of major revolt against the Qing was inevitable given the strategic framework of the times engendered by the underlying conditions present. That it would take the same shape as that of the Taiping, however, is not a given nor is it necessary that it too would fail just as the Taiping did and the other Anti-Qing forces did. Such brings me to the point I was suggesting earlier in terms of impact from a large American missionary movement from roughly 1850 on: could they have an impact on this?
American missionaries would bring with them obviously their religion, which-given the quasi Christian nature of the Taiping-could have some impact on its political development. If nothing else, they would bring with them education structures that could aid in modernization efforts, as well as help to diffuse Western technologies and serve as intermediaries between the wider Western World and the rebellion itself or Chinese society at large. If Hong Rengnan is empowered earlier and sooner, that could have serious effects on its own; he re-introduced Confucius to civil service exams in Taiping territory as well as offered increased trading access to Western nations in order to mollify the populations under Taiping rule and to seek to curry Western favor for the revolt at large in the case of the latter.
Perhaps equally or more important is that the indirect (or possibly direct, given the right advice given at the right time) effects could be felt even if the influence of our hypothetical larger missionary community is not as large. To this I mean, perhaps, a successful Northern Expedition which sees the Taiping go straight for the jugular of the Qing Empire by taking Beijing, instead of bogging itself down in Tianjin. Most modern writing on the conflict suggests this was a major missed opportunity and it's one that the Qing took very seriously, resulting in them making preparations for leading a rump state from Manchuria itself should their worst fears have come to pass. The end result of such a retreat would be the effective death of their Empire, as their (very ironic, it must be said, given the obvious comparisons of their ATL fall to their historical rise) retreat would be a definitive loss of the Mandate of Heaven and preclude a return to power, given the economic and political realities of their new position.
Now, postulating such an event, one must wonder what comes next. Obviously, outside of the Taiping, the various other revolts ongoing would be able to achieve success in the face of the disintegration of the Qing armies fighting them as their source of pay, manpower and weapons dries up. The Taiping would be too busy establishing themselves to immediately confront them either, which would give the other rebellions the ability to solidify their control over their territories themselves. That alone stipulates some degree of "balkanization" of China, at least in the same sense as the 1910s-1930s OTL when the KMT was only able to exercise direct control over a part of China rather than the whole. Perhaps, however, it would get even worse than that. The Taiping were not exactly stable as the Tianjing Incident of 1856 shows, and here their victory has come before such could occur. Thus, the end result of this whole mess could be the collapse of the Qing just for the Taiping to fall apart too and now, from the late 1850s onward China is a mess of warring states that lay open to exploitation by the European powers.
Alternatively, perhaps the Taiping could surprise us or, in the event figures like Hong Rengnan are able to secure their power sooner and thus head off the above mentioned issues, we could have a brighter future ahead for China. Perhaps the Taiping will re-conquer the lost areas in the long run the same as the Qing managed, or perhaps they won't and instead embrace a specifically Han-centric idea of their new Chinese state. Regardless of what happens there, the main effect is that the Taiping-by claiming the Mandate of Heaven from the Qing-represent a totally new system and thus aren’t as tied down by centuries of historical precedent as the Qing were as well as their handicap of being Manchus ruling over a majority Han state. The end result of this could be an earlier, faster modernization of China compared to OTL and thus we get a "Meiji China" in the same way we saw Japan manage to do so historically.
What do you see as most likely here, audience?
Japan and Korea (And France?) -
Staying in the East Asian region but tying it into Europe and events in the Americas, is the question of what the lack of the French Empire's historical 1860s campaign in Mexico could mean. Now, it's well known that the Emperor Napoleon III was a man wanting to turn his Empire into the top global power and that he held a lot of grandiose schemes to get it there, as the Mexican Expedition in of itself showed. However, here that opportunity doesn't exist because, well, Mexico itself doesn't; the U.S. is unlikely to default here (or even take such loans in the first place) nor was Napoleon willing to pick a fight with an undivided (i.e. no Civil War) United States without backing from other players, such as the UK which has no reason to support such anyway. That forces our plucky Emperor to look elsewhere for his efforts, and East Asia immediately leaps out to me as one such area.
Historically, in the early 1860s the domain of Chōshū took the Sonnō jōi edicts to their logical extent, resulting in a four power alliance of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France conducting the Shimonoseki campaign against them. Here, Napoleon III could see his chances with this opportunity and take it for all it's worth, a he did with Mexico under a similar setup in OTL. It is important to note here that France historically was more supportive of the Tokugawa Shogunate than the Meiji coalition, which was more British aligned/back. Given that context, France going in as much as possible against the Chōshū would thus derail the OTL Satsuma–Chōshū Alliance that enabled the Meiji Restoration in the first place; thus, an automatic win for the French-backed Shogunate.
With France taking the historical place the UK held in Japan, this not only increases French influence in East Asia in of itself, it also provides the ability to wield it effectively; perhaps the French expedition to Korea of 1866 will here be successful, allowing Paris to establish a protectorate over the Joseon dynasty? If not, could a French-backed Tokugawa Shogunate have its own version of the Seikanron debate in the early 1870s, resulting in an earlier conquest of the peninsula by Japan? Here, there is no prospect of Qing intervention, while France supporting them could make them feel more secure vis-a-vis the Western Powers.
Canada -
Finally, we turn to the last, most obvious foreign policy effect I can think of from this initial POD by returning to North America and the issue of Canada. Historically, the Civil War-with its rampant militarization of American society and numerous war scares with the UK as a result-was the main contributing factor to the push for Confederation, as it was rightfully judged that unifying all of the Canadian colonies into one would enable them to better withstand American pressure going forward as well as make defense easier with a unified military establishment, should the need arise. Obviously, here, I have argued that no Civil War has happened by the U.S. has, by military means, conquered Mexico and that it will soon economically overtake the UK will be obvious and weigh on the Anglo-Canadians as something to consider. Could this be enough to jumpstart the formation of Canada to the 1850s? I would think yes, as it would seem such an obvious move but it might be too early, needing to wait until the early 1860s for the need to be become obvious with the increasing American power to the South.
One thing of note: without the various wars of the Meiji Restoration and, presuming the Shogunate conquers Korea with French backing, if the Japanese have just a 2% higher growth rate over OTL than by 1940 they will have an economy over 50% the size of the OTL United States.
