Alternate History Ideas and Discussion

History Learner

Well-known member
An early allied victory in WW2 is as simple as not giving them the crippling case of retarditis that led them to sit and do nothing while all of Germany's army was in Poland and the Western border was almost completely undefended.

It wasn't a case of stupidity so much as they weren't ready for the conflict and the German border was actually pretty decently guarded. The French did attempt an offensive in September of 1939, but it immediately bogged down dealing with, for example, land mines that the French literally lacked the engineers to clear out. Significant German reinforcements also soon arrived too, meaning there was limited opportunity.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
One admittedly ASB-tier thought I've had is a setup where Imperial Japan pursues the same plans for conquest as in OTL, but unlike OTL, operates in full accordance with the laws of war. Or as close to it as possible, anyway. Just a random thoght I've had.

On another note, I've long since gotten bored with Confederate victory timelines. Nowadays, I wonder what is earliest date the war could have plausibility ended in Union victory.

Far better for Japan would've been attacking the USSR in 1941 rather than the U.S.

As for a Union victory, 1862 with the Peninsular Campaign. Lincoln handicapped McClellan to a disastrous degree during said operation, and that ultimately prolonged the war until 1865.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
How about this one: rather than launching a rivalry with the United Kingdom, a newly unified Germany positions itself as Britain's friend on the Continent.

This was attempted, but Britain did not take kindly to German colonial or naval ambitions. Basically, to achieve such would require either 1896 Sudan Crisis to be much worse or Berlin to somehow willingly subordinate its own interests to a massive extent to appease the British, with no real gain in the meantime.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
@AndrewJTalon
I know this thread’s more or less dead, but reading the work of @Navarro made me think one question

How possible or hard would it have been if the United States of America was “more accurate” by including all or most of both North and South America

Like Canada and Mexico as “states” and weird situations like South American countries being torn between having populations wanting to illegally migrate or fight being conquered and remade into parts of the USA or similar

I’m sorta guessing a problem with elections and the economy would occur

That said, an entire nation composed of two continents with way more than 50 states....how long would that last?

All of Mexico and Cuba, for example, is doable with a PoD in the 1850s.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
So I was thinking of Operation Downfall and it’s consequences.


Reading this TL and watching a few videos on the subject.

Let’s assume Downfall happens and the higher end American casualties results(far more than in the TL above)-500,000 to nearly a million.

The US occupies southern Japan with the British commonwealth getting its own zone, and the soviets get Hokkaido and maybe northern strips of Honshu.

The war itself continues into 1947.


What are the broader consequences for the Cold War?

A few things to start off with

-Soviet Korea and Manchuria
-The US soldiers returning are greatly traumatized with higher rates of PTSD than OTL, which causes more social problems and the like.
-I’m somewhat hesitant on the effects of this on American society. It’s not anything like Soviet Union casualties but it’s more losses in the invasion than the rest of the war combined. Does it make the US more interventionist? More isolationist?
-Soviet Korea and Manchuria probably means Communist victory in China. Such as it is, I don’t see the US intervening to prevent the nationalist’s downfall. Stalin was fine with China divided IIRC but mao will still the momentum.
-Japan becomes a front in the Cold War.

The Soviet plan for an invasion of Hokkaido wasn't really an invasion; it was supposed to be an administrative landing under peace time conditions following the Japanese surrender. This is because, if attempted, the Soviets only had 28th Corps against 100,000 Japanese troops in Hokkaido organized into four divisions with 450 aircraft, meaning a Soviet landing force would be rapidly repulsed if not outright annihilated. The "how" in terms of Naval capacity to conduct such is also there, because on August 15th the Soviets were still conducting their initial operations in the Kuriles and had already lost half of the LCIs given to them by the U.S. under the HULA extension of Lend Lease. It would take until September to complete that operation, after which the shipping was immediately shipped to Korea in order to expedite the Soviet occupation of their zone.

In short, they lacked the ability to invade at all but, even ignoring that, could not do such successfully. D.M. Gianreco's book Hell to Pay is a great read on the matter of Operation Downfall and the revised edition came out years after the author of that timeline first started making his/her timeline, so that probably explains the differences. In my opinion, my take away from Gianreco was that the Operation would fail with nearly one million casualties and it would take the Soviets until the Spring of 1946 to finish operations on the Asian mainland.
 
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This is because, if attempted, the Soviets only had 28th Corps against 100,000 Japanese troops in Hokkaido organized into four divisions with 450 aircraft, meaning a Soviet landing force would be rapidly repulsed if not outright annihilated.
Wait source? I did not think the Japanese had many soldiers on Hokkaido. As it was, didn't the US have a naval transfer program? Operation Hula or something? To give the Soviets landing craft.

and it would take the Soviets until the Spring of 1946 to finish operations on the Asian mainland.
Didn't the Soviets steamroll the Japanese in Manchuria? That was my impression anyway. I suppose it would take longer in Mountainous Korea, so I suppose six months is a reasonable estimate.

n my opinion, my take away from Gianreco was that the Operation would fail with nearly one million casualties
One million casualties I can believe, I find it hard to believe the operation would fail. The US would drown the Japanese in numbers and if necessary chemical or nuclear weapons.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Wait source? I did not think the Japanese had many soldiers on Hokkaido. As it was, didn't the US have a naval transfer program? Operation Hula or something? To give the Soviets landing craft.

Operation Hula was the transfer program, yes, in which they transferred about a dozen and half LCIs to the Soviets. Half of them were lost during operations in the Kurile islands, and were then transferred to help with the Soviet occupation of Korea. With just 8 LCIs and a 400 mile roundtrip to Vladivostok for supplies/troops, this would give Japanese the ability to concentrate forces and allow for the 454 aircraft to sink the remainder of the Soviet amphibious lift capability.

With regards to Hokkaido, the formations in question were the 7th Infantry Division (Type A, specializing in Arctic Warfare transferred from the Kwantung Army), the 42nd Infantry Division, the 101th Independent Mixed Brigade, and 7th Armored Regiment. Included were associated support personnel, IJN and IJAAF service members, with 454 aircraft subdivided into 101 fighters, 35 bombers, 131 recon, 151 transport, and 36 trainers. The total for the IJA forces-thus excluding the IJN detachments- was 101,029 personnel.

Sources are D.M. Gianreco's Hell to Pay and the JM-85 monograph.

Didn't the Soviets steamroll the Japanese in Manchuria? That was my impression anyway. I suppose it would take longer in Mountainous Korea, so I suppose six months is a reasonable estimate.

They had not, the Kwantung Army was intact and its retreat was in accordance with its existing defensive plan of withdrawing into the Tunghua Redoubt. To quote from the U.S. Army's JM-155 monograph, based on Post-War analysis of Japanese records:

"The loss of effectiveness had not been accompanied, however, by an equal loss of morale, for although the Soviet Army accomplished its objective of defeating the Kwantung Army it did not do so in a true military sense, since the Kwantung Army--much of it still intact--did not surrender because of military necessity but at the command of the Japanese emperor."​

One million casualties I can believe, I find it hard to believe the operation would fail. The US would drown the Japanese in numbers and if necessary chemical or nuclear weapons.

To quote from the thesis of Marine Major Mark P. Arens's study of the V Marine Amphibious Corps' proposed role in the plan:

"If Operation Olympic had been executed, as planned, on 1 November 1945, it would have been the largest bloodbath in American history. Although American forces had superior fire power and were better trained and equipped than the Japanese soldier, the close-in, fanatical combat between infantrymen would have been devastating to both sides [...] The total casualty estimate of 328,000 equates to 57 percent of the U.S. ground forces slated for Olympic. On the Satsuma Peninsula, the V Amphibious Corps casualty estimate would have been 13,000 killed and 34,000 wounded, or approximately 54 percent of the Marine force. This casualty estimate for VAC is made without any additional Japanese forces moving into the 40th Army's zone. Add to these estimates the results of kamikaze attacks against transports, and the battle for Kyushu would have been devastating to the American people.​
[T]he intelligence estimates of the Japanese forces and their capabilities on Kyushu, for Operation Olympic, were so inaccurate that an amphibious assault by the V Amphibious Corps would have failed."​
 
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Hmm. That is really fascinating. I had thought Japanese forces in Hokkaido were marginal at best.

They had not, the Kwantung Army was intact and its retreat was in accordance with its existing defensive plan of withdrawing into the Tunghua Redoubt. To quote from the U.S. Army's JM-155 monograph, based on Post-War analysis of Japanese records:

"The loss of effectiveness had not been accompanied, however, by an equal loss of morale, for although the Soviet Army accomplished its objective of defeating the Kwantung Army it did not do so in a true military sense, since the Kwantung Army--much of it still intact--did not surrender because of military necessity but at the command of the Japanese emperor."
Hmm, that is interesting. Still the Soviets won and their advance was ahead of schedule. I don't see the under strength Japanese army lasting more than as you implied six months.

To quote from the thesis of Marine Major Mark P. Arens's study of the V Marine Amphibious Corps' proposed role in the plan:

"If Operation Olympic had been executed, as planned, on 1 November 1945, it would have been the largest bloodbath in American history. Although American forces had superior fire power and were better trained and equipped than the Japanese soldier, the close-in, fanatical combat between infantrymen would have been devastating to both sides [...] The total casualty estimate of 328,000 equates to 57 percent of the U.S. ground forces slated for Olympic. On the Satsuma Peninsula, the V Amphibious Corps casualty estimate would have been 13,000 killed and 34,000 wounded, or approximately 54 percent of the Marine force. This casualty estimate for VAC is made without any additional Japanese forces moving into the 40th Army's zone. Add to these estimates the results of kamikaze attacks against transports, and the battle for Kyushu would have been devastating to the American people.[T]he intelligence estimates of the Japanese forces and their capabilities on Kyushu, for Operation Olympic, were so inaccurate that an amphibious assault by the V Amphibious Corps would have failed."
That wouldn't defeat the Americans though? They'd just bring in more troops from Europe. As for public opinion, I imagine at first the public would be shocked but then out of rage would demand the US continue the war until Japan would crushed into dust.*

*this is the inevitable outcome, even if Olympic had been beaten back, the US would have just bombed again, and then done it later.

I suppose that would continue the war, and that yes eventually the American public might have wished to simply make peace with Japan, as would elements of the government.

So...that means the war continues into the later forties?
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Hmm, that is interesting. Still the Soviets won and their advance was ahead of schedule. I don't see the under strength Japanese army lasting more than as you implied six months.

The Soviet objective had been to encircle and destroy the Kwantung Army, at the time of the surrender they had failed to accomplish this or the occupation of any of the major cities of Manchuria. To quote from S.M. Shtemenko's "The Soviet General Staff at War" states, on page 354:

"To precipitate a real surrender and prevent unnecessary bloodshed, it was decided to land airborne forces at key points in the enemy's lines - Harbin, Kirin, Mukden, Changchun, and some other cities of Manchuria and Korea. After 17:00 hours on August 18th aircraft carrying the first group of 120 airborne troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Zabelin took off from Horol and set course for Harbin. This force had the task of seizing the aerodrome and other important military installations, protecting the bridges on the Sungari and holding them until the main forces of the First Far Eastern Front arrived. With the first echelon of the airborne force was Major-General G.A. Shelakhov, the Front's deputy chief of staff, who had been appointed special representative of the Military Council. His duties were to present a surrender ultimatum to the command of the Japanese forces in Harbin and dictate its terms to them. We had no precise information about the situation of the city and the Soviet Consulate there. All we knew was that the main forces of the First Front of the Kwantung Army were falling back on Harbin after their defeat at Mutanchiang. They formed a very considerable force."​

I should note this particular passage is about the First Area Army in particular, so even in the Soviet's judgement the forces they had engaged heavily were still a potent enemy. This is especially notable as well, given that despite the weakened posture of the Kwantung Army in 1945 compared to previous years, the forces at Mutanchiang inflicted equal losses upon the Soviets, destroyed hundreds of tanks and thereafter remained combat capable while conducting an orderly withdraw in the aftermath.

The Kwantung Army's planning at the time of the surrender was to withdraw into the Tunghua Redoubt, in Southern Manchuria near Korea; it is a mountainous area where the Japanese had prepared fortifications. Aiding this plan was the withdraw of the China Expeditionary Army into the coastal areas of China, done in order to shorten their own supply lines and allow for a better defense for prepared positions. This allowed IGHQ to detach six divisions and six brigades from the CEA, including the 3rd Tank Division, as reinforcements into Manchuria. All told, this represented about 180,000 to 200,000 Japanese soldiers from well trained, veteran formations would be joining the already 750,000 man Kwnatung Army into the redoubt, which was in a mountain zone with already prepared fortifications. So, all together, you're looking at about just under a million Japanese soldiers against around 1.5 million Soviets.

That the Japanese were consistently achieving a 1 for 1, or even better, ratio against both the Soviets and the Americans, this alone should be telling. Soviet medical records pre-invasion had projected at least 540,000 to 600,000 casualties, meaning that the observed battles by the time of the Japanese surrender indicated casualties were going to be much higher than thought. Adding to this issue was the very real supply constraints the Red Army was operating under.

According to Shtemenko, at the onset of operations STAVKA directed that the Kwantung Army be destroyed within 8 weeks or else the logistical situation would become "perilous". It's easy to see why they stated this, because the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway was limited to 13 million tons yearly in 1945 and of this only 9.3 million tons could be used for military needs; this is exactly why the Soviets requested MILEPOST deliveries from the United States. According to John R. Deane's "The Strange Alliance", on pages 263-264, the statistics provided by the Red Army to the United States as part of MILEPOST showed that they would be at a monthly deficit of 200,000 tons. Thus, the 1.25 million tons the U.S. provided in the three months between V-E Day and the Soviet invasion in August gave the Soviets a very limited window to achieve decisive results because after that it would become impossible. With official Soviet belligerency eliminating the ability of further MILEPOST shipments (The Japanese only allowed Soviet shipping through their waters while they were neutral) and the inability to expand rail capacity in the Far East (The Soviets started a project to do so Pre-War...and it took until 1984 to complete IOTL), we know the eight weeks limit is firm.

I should also add that eight weeks might be too generous. Their exploitation force was bingo on fuel and thus immobile by day three of combat operations:

"Soviet sources do recognize severe short comings in their own logistical planning. The available supply transports were too few to cope with the demand. The road conditions were poor and, together with the rainy weather, caused severe delays in resupply operations. Estimates of fuel requirements were proved to be totally wrong. This severely affected the 6th Guards Tank Army in western Manchuria. This mobile army which was to operate deep behind enemy lines as an operational manoeuvre group (oMG) was in fact out of fuel already on the third day of the operation. It had to be resupplied with emergency air transportation of fuel. one peculiar fact is that the Soviet logistical planning relied heavily on the unrealistic assumption of using enemy railroads for troop and sup ply transports in Manchuria. This raises serious questions of the quality of the Soviet logistical planning. Another explanation is that the Soviet attack actually began before all necessary logistical preparations were in place. However, by launching an attack at an early stage it probably contributed to the creation of surprise."​

That wouldn't defeat the Americans though? They'd just bring in more troops from Europe. As for public opinion, I imagine at first the public would be shocked but then out of rage would demand the US continue the war until Japan would crushed into dust.*

*this is the inevitable outcome, even if Olympic had been beaten back, the US would have just bombed again, and then done it later.

I suppose that would continue the war, and that yes eventually the American public might have wished to simply make peace with Japan, as would elements of the government.

So...that means the war continues into the later forties?

The U.S. landing force was to be, in total, about 700,000 men. Contrary to what U.S. intelligence thought and to which Major Arens points out was the case, the IJA had 900,000 men in position with the expectation of 90,000 reinforcements, exclusive of any IJN, IJAAF or civilian militias to be used. As Iwo Jima and Okinawa had showed, the Japanese had by this point in the war refined their tactics to routinely achieve 1:1 or even better ratios of casualties. I'll cite some casualty projections:
  • In a letter to General Curtis LeMay when LeMay assumed command of the B-29 force on Guam, General Lauris Norstad told LeMay that if an invasion took place, it would cost the US "half a million" dead.
  • In July MacArthur's Intelligence Chief, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, warned of between 210,000 and 280,000 battle casualties in the push to the "stop line" one-third of the way up Kyushu. Even when rounded down to a conservative 200,000, this figure implied a total of nearly 500,000 all-causes losses, of whom perhaps 50,000 might return to duty after light to moderate care.
  • n the spring of 1945, the Army Service Forces under Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell was working under a figure of "approximately" 720,000 for the projected replacements needed for "dead and evacuated wounded" through December 31, 1946, which was for the whole invasion including Honshu. These figures are for Army and Army Air Force personnel only, and do not include replacements needed for the Navy and Marine Corps.
  • A study done for Secretary of War Henry Stimson's staff by William Shockley estimated that invading Japan would cost 1.7–4 million American casualties, including 400,000–800,000 fatalities, and five to ten million Japanese fatalities. The key assumption was large-scale participation by civilians in the defense of Japan.
  • The US Sixth Army, the formation tasked with carrying out the major land fighting on Kyushu, estimated a figure of 394,859 casualties serious enough to be permanently removed from unit roll calls during the first 120 days on Kyushu, barely enough to avoid outstripping the planned replacement stream.
Operating under the assumption of just 300,000 to 500,000 defenders, 6th Army was already projecting the replacement stream would be brought to the point of being unable to cope; as already pointed out, that's major, as actual defenders were over 900,000. As for troops from Europe in terms of formations, no existing planning was conducted to do such meaning there was none in the "replacement stream" to be used. To do so would require the Army to halt their entire demobilization plan-politically unpopular-and then reorganize their forces in Europe and then begin the long running transfer of the same to the Pacific. This would take, on average, about three months or so. Operation Olympic would be, as Major Arens points out, decided long before then.
 
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The US had 12 million men under arms? And could definitely conscript more.

I fail to see how Olympic failing would make any difference, especially given the US planned to nuke a dozen or so Japanese cities.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
The US had 12 million men under arms? And could definitely conscript more.

I fail to see how Olympic failing would make any difference, especially given the US planned to nuke a dozen or so Japanese cities.

The U.S. had begun demobilization in the Summer of 1945, returning veteran units home and was thus increasingly dependent on the monthly influx of 100,000 men under Selective Service for the Army (Navy and Marines received 40,000 per month); this was regarded as the maximum monthly amount that could be inducted into service via the draft. As 6th Army's planning staff noted, the casualties under their expectations of the Japanese defenses would nearly exceed this monthly allowance; given Japanese forces were, depending on which way you look at it, 2-3x larger than expected, this would've exceeded the replacement stream's capacity to make up for.

To put this into context, in April of 1945 JCS adopted ratios based on the experiences sustained in both Europe and the Pacific, with the Pacific one being 1.95 dead and missing and 7.45 total casualties/1,000 men/day. Applying that to DOWNFALL results in 878,453 killed or missing and 2,481,233 wounded, or 3,359,686 in total. This was before the brutal lessons learned at Okinawa, the most costly engagement of the Pacific War.

Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb by Michael Pearlman gives some insight into the matter.
 
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The U.S. had begun demobilization in the Summer of 1945, returning veteran units home and was thus increasingly dependent on the monthly influx of 100,000 men under Selective Service for the Army (Navy and Marines received 40,000 per month); this was regarded as the maximum monthly amount that could be inducted into service via the draft. As 6th Army's planning staff noted, the casualties under their expectations of the Japanese defenses would nearly exceed this monthly allowance; given Japanese forces were, depending on which way you look at it, 2-3x larger than expected, this would've exceeded the replacement stream's capacity to make up for.

To put this into context, in April of 1945 JCS adopted ratios based on the experiences sustained in both Europe and the Pacific, with the Pacific one being 1.95 dead and missing and 7.45 total casualties/1,000 men/day. Applying that to DOWNFALL results in 878,453 killed or missing and 2,481,233 wounded, or 3,359,686 in total. This was before the brutal lessons learned at Okinawa, the most costly engagement of the Pacific War.

Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb by Michael Pearlman gives some insight into the matter.
That's all very interesting data. But what does this say with regards to the counter factual?
 

History Learner

Well-known member
The outcome of WW2, the fate of the Japanese empire, and the length of the war.

That Operation Downfall would fail, as the U.S. could not replace its losses fast enough. In terms of the wider ramifications, I'll quote from Pearlman:

In one way or another, George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff, had long been expecting a sharp reduction in military morale. He had witnessed, as aide-decamp to General John J. Pershing, America's mood after World War I. Once Germany asked for an armistice (and before it signed a surrender), Congress and the public had demanded a swift demobilization. This indelible memory of November 1918 shaped Marshall's resolve to minimize military responsibilities after the Nazi capitulation. In Europe, this meant an end to operations in the eastern Mediterranean, where internal political conflicts and instabilities might require a large and long-term occupation by an army about to be drastically reduced in size. In the Pacific, the Japanese would have to be beaten into a position where their surrender would occur shortly after V-E Day. Otherwise, there might not be a capitulation at all, something Marshall predicted in 1943: "the collapse of Germany would impose partial demobilization and a growing impatience ... throughout the United States." This mood could lead to a compromise settlement along the lines the Japanese Army was hoping to obtain: that is, the retention of the core empire it still occupied (Formosa, Manchuria, and Korea) and no change in the political institutions of Japan.2
America's military timing was exceptionally good, considering the enormous perplexities of the war. When Germany surrendered in May, the United States had already made what Marshall called the "preparation for the final kill." Its armed forces surrounded the home islands of Japan from the south and the east. It had also obtained from Russia a pledge to attack the Japanese Imperial Army in Manchuria, thereby completing the ironclad blockade that the U.S. Navy once planned to execute alone. However, the denial of imports of strategic items, from oil to coal and protein, did not mean that a mere mop-up operation was in the works, Most of the U.S. military, especially the Army, conducted planning on the premise "that defeat of the enemy's armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to unconditional surrender." Even before Japan strongly reinforced Kyushu, the first home island the United States would invade, the American military calculated that America would still have to conduct the toughest landings and follow-up battles seen in World War II --- actions that would likely result in some 200,000 casualties and 50,000 fatalities.3 Admiral William D. Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an advocate of the blockade strategy, would later complain that "the Army did not appear to be able to understand that the Navy, with some Army air assistance, already had defeated Japan." The flaw in Leahy's argument was that the Japanese Imperial Army refused to accept the fact that it had lost the war, at least by the standard of unconditional surrender. That demand was completely unacceptable to an institution that ordered wounded soldiers to commit suicide rather than become prisoners of war.4​
Leahy admitted however, that there was "little prospect of obtaining unconditional surrender" in 1945, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, would write that the Navy "in the course of time would have starved the Japanese into submission" (Italics mine). Time, however, was a waning asset, especially to Marshall, who would later say that American "political and economic institutions melted out from under us [the U.S. military]". The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion told the JCS what magazines and newspapers had been printing since late 1944: there was overwhelming public pressure to increase production of consumer goods. I am "afraid of unrest in the country," said Director Fred Vinson. I have never seen "the people in their present frame of mind." Aside from reports about the "national end-of-the-war psychology among [the] citizens" of the United States, the JCS heard from its own military intelligence community. Their best estimate was that total victory through encirclement, blockade, and bombardment might well take "a great many years."5​
 
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So simply assuming Downfall goes ahead, and the government under Truman pressed on with the war, would the American public have revolted? Is that the implication?

At the same time...surely if the veterans had been demobilized, surely they could be called back up? I guess there'd be draft riots, but the US as I understand it was a much more cohesive society then.

One factor, I find difficult to imagine-if the casualties the Americans sustained were that great, what would the impact be on the psyche of the population?

You cite the mood of the country-allowing for the retention of core Japanese territories, but that would be a mood, not national policy.

I suppose I'm asking, when would the government actually give up, and say "you know what, Japan can keep its core territories and institutions, we hear you don't like communism, so cool?"

I find it ridiculous that would have happened, at least in 1945-1946. Maybe, had the war continued on towards the end of the decade I could see that being the case, especially once the Truman administration was gone.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
So simply assuming Downfall goes ahead, and the government under Truman pressed on with the war, would the American public have revolted? Is that the implication?

At the same time...surely if the veterans had been demobilized, surely they could be called back up? I guess there'd be draft riots, but the US as I understand it was a much more cohesive society then.

One factor, I find difficult to imagine-if the casualties the Americans sustained were that great, what would the impact be on the psyche of the population?

You cite the mood of the country-allowing for the retention of core Japanese territories, but that would be a mood, not national policy.

I suppose I'm asking, when would the government actually give up, and say "you know what, Japan can keep its core territories and institutions, we hear you don't like communism, so cool?"

I find it ridiculous that would have happened, at least in 1945-1946. Maybe, had the war continued on towards the end of the decade I could see that being the case, especially once the Truman administration was gone.

I wouldn't go so far as to say revolts, although even in 1945 there was particularly nasty and serious mutinies/draft riots already breaking out, including a very serious one in the Philippines among troops demanding to be returned home. With the failure of Operation Olympic (the invasion of Kyushu), the overall Operation Downfall cannot continue as air bases in Kyushu were needed to attempt Operation Coronet (the invasion of Honshu). That leaves just the "Bomb and Blockade" strategy of Admiral Leahy, which as he conceded would take years and was joined in this by the War Department's analysts. Basically, at that point, the belief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that civilian political will would break before the Japanese did, forcing them to come to some sort of compromise peace instead of the unconditional surrender they managed to force historically.

As far as timeframe? The general thought was that it would take until 1947 ("From Hell to Heaven in '47" ) or 1948 ("Golden Gate in '48") to finish the Japanese off under the Blockade strategy. Problem was, 1946 is a midterms year, meaning that the national mood would thus be reflected in policy no later than that juncture. My personal take is President Truman would throw in the towel in early 1946 and we'd get a compromise peace deal that year, so as to avoid a blood bath in Congress that would force his hand then. The Soviets would still take Manchuria and Northern Korea, the U.S. would still get the South. We'd have a rump Empire of Japan, still holding the Kuriles and Formosa, however, and unoccupied with the ruling regime still in place. By the mid 1950s, there would probably be a reconciliation as the U.S. began to rely on the Japanese to face down the Soviets in the Northern Pacific.

Would benefit of the extra carnage? The PRC wouldn't exist, as the KMT would benefit from a longer fight with Japan as it would make them the chief liberators of China. Additionally, it would not result in the interregnum of late 1945, where the CCP was able to use the lull in security patrols by the IJA to establish themselves in many areas before the KMT could arrive in force to secure them from the surrendered Japanese.
 
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History Learner

Well-known member
And you don't think three hundred thousand American deaths wouldn't spur the public to rage, to finish off Japan for good?

In my personal opinion, based on the available evidence, no. To quote from Pearlman again:

Unconditional surrender was primarily a battle cry meant "to concentrate the attention of public opinion upon the winning of the war." As a coherent statement of political objectives, it had two competing definitions, when it had any clear meaning at all.8 Definition number one, used in State Department memoranda and within the Army's general staff, did "not mean absence of terms, but [that] whatever terms are imposed do not result from a bargain or a barter with the enemy." The victor laid down all conditions. For the vanquished, those conditions were unconditional.9 In definition number two, Japanese surrender was "not subject to conditions or limitations." In this case, the victor had absolute freedom over the vanquished because, as generals and diplomats put it, the enemy "is actually signing a 'blank check'"; there are "no contractual elements whatever."10​
The armed forces and career diplomats preferred definition number one, as did Republican politicians (former President Herbert Hoover and senators from the Midwest and Northeast states) and certain elite publications, such as the Christian Century. 11 Other publications (from the Christian Science Monitor to mass circulation magazines) favored definition number two, as did political appointees in the State Department and Southern Democrats (identified below). As for President Franklin D. Roosevelt, he appears to have done what he typically did whenever forced to choose one thing or the other. He chose both, then discarded the option least suited to the specific problem at hand. For Germany, he preferred no specifications; for Japan, no negotiations. Since this differentiation was hardly popular least of all, treating Japan more leniently -- Roosevelt was opaque, as demonstrated by his reference to Grant's conversation with Lee at the end of the Civil War: "Take the animals home and do the spring plowing.... That is what we mean by unconditional surrender."12​
So-called clarifications, like this vague and pointless historical anecdote, must have mystified the Japanese as badly as it did most Americans. The Japanese, consequently, thought U.S. policy towards Germany foretold the position towards them (both policies were called "Unconditional surrender"). Actually, U.S. policy did not clearly move in that direction until FDR died in April 1945.13 According to Leahy's notes at the Washington Conference (May 1943), "the grand strategy of the war remained fixed on achieving unconditional surrender of the Axis powers in Europe while [only?] maintaining pressure on Japan to secure positions from which her ultimate surrender could be forced."​
At the Cairo Conference (November 1943), the communiqué drafted by Harry Hopkins, at Roosevelt's instruction, made the obligatory demand for unconditional surrender. Then, it set specific stipulations, consistent with a series of position papers. drafted by State Department professionals and Asia specialists. None of the points were draconian, at least compared to those imposed on Germany. Japan was to be "stripped of all" its overseas conquests, presumably to quarantine a nation that Roosevelt believed was genetically disposed towards acts of lawless violence. The president's policy of isolating Japan from the rest of Asia may have smacked of political eugenics, but nothing was said about occupation, demilitarization, war trials, or the emperor of Japan. Nor was there any hint of the worst fear of one JCS intelligence officer: a bloody invasion of the home island that would destroy the imperial Japanese government before it could negotiate a peace.14 The Cairo communiqué was certainly not good news in Tokyo. Prime Minister Hideki Tojo said it meant Japan was to be reduced to a third-rate state. But he said nothing about what other Japanese would dread: that unconditional surrender meant the destruction of the nation and the ruin of the Japanese race. These Japanese officials made a mistake in assuming that the communiqué was just American propaganda, not a serious statement of terms.15​
Specific conditions that the Cairo communiqué mentioned and omitted were not inadvertent. That November (1943), Roosevelt had asked China to conduct the postwar occupation of Japan. Its leader, Chiang Kai-shek, wanted an Allied pledge to punish the Japanese as war criminals, yet be dodged responsibility for occupation duty, deferring it back to the United States. He and Roosevelt then agreed "that as soon as Japan's military power has been broken, the Japanese in Japan proper would be permitted to work out their own destiny without outside direction." In short, there would be no occupation, let alone transformation of a society, such as Roosevelt planned for Germany. There, a generation was to be fed from U.S. Army trucks so that they would learn how badly they had been beaten -- far cry from the plan for the Far East that Roosevelt and Stalin made at Teheran. The Allies would only control "islands in the vicinity of Japan," hoping this would suffice to deter and prevent a renewed "course of aggression."16​
Wise or foolish, that geographical objective was perfectly consistent with the U.S. military means available and emphasized in late 1943. Over objections from Admiral King and General Marshall, who still hoped for a major base in continental Asia, Roosevelt abandoned new operations in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater lest they divert soldiers and landing craft from the invasion of Europe in 1944. ("He was Commander-in-Chief," wrote Leahy, "and that ended the argument.") CBI, thereafter, became a backwater campaign, like the D-Day operation had relegated the Italian campaign in the European theater. With most ground forces now unequivocally committed to France, a reasonable military strategy was to win the war with Japan from the Pacific Ocean with sea and air power. This could force an "ultimate surrender" -- provided terms were not too harsh. However, air and sea power were hardly sufficient for what Allied planners later called the "absolute military control of Japan" itself. It was no accident that the top brass of the Navy--Admirals Leahy, King, and Chester W. Nimitz--all spoke against unconditional surrender. That implied a protracted occupation that only the Army could provide.17​
Leaving an unoccupied Japan in control of Formosa and the Kuriles was overall pretty consistent with the positions taken by FDR and other American government officials over the course of the war.
 

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