Most of your points have been addressed by other people, but now I also have the time to answer your drivel.
"Discrediting Fatah" has never been a victory condition in this conflict with Israel, so it is irrelevant. Furthermore, continuous development of capabilities is irrelevant to discrediting Fatah. As long as Hamas doesn't score an actual, visible victory in the form of major political concessions from Israel, concessions that Fatah failed to achieve, but Hamas succeeded through force of arms, improvements in their military capabilities do not do anything to discredit Fatah.
OK, a bold claim. Let's see your evidence of that.
There is no evidence that this is the case. In 2014 Israel made a very limited incursion specifically to destroy cross-border attack tunnels. It had a limited, tactical aim, in which it fully succeeded, as is evident by the fact no attack tunnels were used by Hamas in this conflict (they have all been destroyed in 2014, and the IDF developed further countermeasures against them).
Israel has always refrained from using its ground forces unless strictly necessary, opting to use its air force wherever it could instead. Should the air force prove insufficient toward achieving a certain goal, I see no evidence that the IDF would refrain from sending its ground forces to achieve said goal.
In this round of fighting, as you may have noticed, the IDF had a huge bank of targets that could successfully be bombed from the air. It also successfully assassinated a whole bunch of senior Hamas officers, again, from the air. In return, it suffered some light casualties, 12 people killed. There was absolutely no pressure to involve the ground forces in risky, high-casualty operations, when the air force was doing its job perfectly well.
If the casualties started mounting on the Israeli side, if a ceasefire wasn't forced by Biden, and if the air force had time to bomb out the entirety of its pre-prepared target bank, you would have very likely seen a ground operation by the IDF, limited or otherwise.
That is nonsense. At the opening of the war (May 11th), a powerful volley of ~130 rockets was launched at the Tel Aviv area, killing one. A few days later, another volley on Tel Aviv, this time of only ~40 rockets.
The last such volley was on May 15th (Hebrew link). This is another advantage of actually being on the ground and experiencing events, rather than reading about them sporadically from the twisted lens of Western media reporting. I actually have a clear understanding of the timeline of rocket attacks on Israel, which you obviously lack.
Then, after multiple threats of launching on Tel Aviv again if Israel continues targeting Hamas officers, there was zilch. Israel continued to ignore the threats, and continued to carry out attacks against Hamas officers, as well as targeting multi-story buildings. Hamas kept threatening, without delivering. Only the south was continued to be bombed, and even then with lesser regularity and firepower.
If that's not "denting the capabilities of Hamas to sustain action", I don't know what is.
All of this is predicated on the false premise that Israel will not engage in ground warfare under any circumstances, which is laughable.
Both Vietnam and Afghanistan were countries on the other side of the ocean from the US (and with a huge land buffer between Afghanistan and the USSR's centers of power). The situations are NOT comparable. Neither the US nor the USSR ever experienced artillery barrages on their civilian populations from these areas. If you think that Hamas can exhaust Israel's will to fight under these conditions, the way Vietnam and Afghanistan did to the American people's will, think again. And that's after 16 years of on and off fighting with Gaza. Israel can sustain the status quo for a very, very long time, and if Israel actually felt threatened by these "thousand cuts", then well, it still has a LOT of reserve military power that it never used in this conflict, including the option of ground operations.
In the meantime, Hamas' own stated goals of "defending Jerusalem" have not been realized, and furthermore, Israel has announced that it'll change the rules of the game, and will no longer contain and ignore low-intensity rocket fire from Gaza. It remains to be seen which side will actually follow their own stated policies, although so far Hamas has already dropped the ball in this regard.
First, you are welcome to cite anywhere in my posts I said military improvements alone constitute a victory. Rather, I based my statements on the facts acknowledged by non Arab sources; namely, that Hamas has discredited Fatah pretty heavily through this, for one key example.
"Discrediting Fatah" has never been a victory condition in this conflict with Israel, so it is irrelevant. Furthermore, continuous development of capabilities is irrelevant to discrediting Fatah. As long as Hamas doesn't score an actual, visible victory in the form of major political concessions from Israel, concessions that Fatah failed to achieve, but Hamas succeeded through force of arms, improvements in their military capabilities do not do anything to discredit Fatah.
Specific to the points made, you tacitly conceded at the end of this post exactly what I was saying; Israeli options are increasingly limited.
OK, a bold claim. Let's see your evidence of that.
2014 broke them of the desire to put ground troops into Gaza
There is no evidence that this is the case. In 2014 Israel made a very limited incursion specifically to destroy cross-border attack tunnels. It had a limited, tactical aim, in which it fully succeeded, as is evident by the fact no attack tunnels were used by Hamas in this conflict (they have all been destroyed in 2014, and the IDF developed further countermeasures against them).
Israel has always refrained from using its ground forces unless strictly necessary, opting to use its air force wherever it could instead. Should the air force prove insufficient toward achieving a certain goal, I see no evidence that the IDF would refrain from sending its ground forces to achieve said goal.
In this round of fighting, as you may have noticed, the IDF had a huge bank of targets that could successfully be bombed from the air. It also successfully assassinated a whole bunch of senior Hamas officers, again, from the air. In return, it suffered some light casualties, 12 people killed. There was absolutely no pressure to involve the ground forces in risky, high-casualty operations, when the air force was doing its job perfectly well.
If the casualties started mounting on the Israeli side, if a ceasefire wasn't forced by Biden, and if the air force had time to bomb out the entirety of its pre-prepared target bank, you would have very likely seen a ground operation by the IDF, limited or otherwise.
and in 2021 they were forced to rely upon airstrikes....which utterly failed to dent the capabilities of Hamas to sustain action.
That is nonsense. At the opening of the war (May 11th), a powerful volley of ~130 rockets was launched at the Tel Aviv area, killing one. A few days later, another volley on Tel Aviv, this time of only ~40 rockets.
The last such volley was on May 15th (Hebrew link). This is another advantage of actually being on the ground and experiencing events, rather than reading about them sporadically from the twisted lens of Western media reporting. I actually have a clear understanding of the timeline of rocket attacks on Israel, which you obviously lack.
Then, after multiple threats of launching on Tel Aviv again if Israel continues targeting Hamas officers, there was zilch. Israel continued to ignore the threats, and continued to carry out attacks against Hamas officers, as well as targeting multi-story buildings. Hamas kept threatening, without delivering. Only the south was continued to be bombed, and even then with lesser regularity and firepower.
If that's not "denting the capabilities of Hamas to sustain action", I don't know what is.
Case in point:
In 2006, Hezbullah fired 4,000 rockets in 34 days.
In 2014, Gaza fired 4,564 rockets in 50 days.
In 2021, Gaza fired 4,360 rockets were fired in just 11 days.
So if ground invasions are out and air-strikes aren't cutting it, what exactly does that leave Israel with? The Iron Dome does have a 90% interception rate, sure, but you are missing the point there in that it is far cheaper and easier for Hamas to sustain its rocket barrages then it is for Israel to maintain it's counter. That's basic logistics and attrition warfare, which also explains why Bibi even agreed to an armistice and the U.S. immediately was announcing it was going to resupply them; it's expensive and hard to keep the Iron Dome operating under such intensities. Even then, the system does have a saturation point at which it's ability to achieve that 90% doesn't happen because it's been exhausted of munitions or is overloaded with targets.
All of this is predicated on the false premise that Israel will not engage in ground warfare under any circumstances, which is laughable.
Vietnam, Afghanistan and the list goes on;
Both Vietnam and Afghanistan were countries on the other side of the ocean from the US (and with a huge land buffer between Afghanistan and the USSR's centers of power). The situations are NOT comparable. Neither the US nor the USSR ever experienced artillery barrages on their civilian populations from these areas. If you think that Hamas can exhaust Israel's will to fight under these conditions, the way Vietnam and Afghanistan did to the American people's will, think again. And that's after 16 years of on and off fighting with Gaza. Israel can sustain the status quo for a very, very long time, and if Israel actually felt threatened by these "thousand cuts", then well, it still has a LOT of reserve military power that it never used in this conflict, including the option of ground operations.
In the meantime, Hamas' own stated goals of "defending Jerusalem" have not been realized, and furthermore, Israel has announced that it'll change the rules of the game, and will no longer contain and ignore low-intensity rocket fire from Gaza. It remains to be seen which side will actually follow their own stated policies, although so far Hamas has already dropped the ball in this regard.
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